What makes it hard for China to embrace universal values?

中国接受普适价值究竟难在何处?

By He Qinglian on November 5, 2012.

China has difficulties embracing universal values for many reasons. First of all, the stone-minded CPC set in place the “five no's” principles to stifle the people's pursuit of democracy and freedom. If it is only the CPC that is stubborn, the issue could be overcome gradually. The problem, though, is that after years of domestication by the rulers, some Chinese people have not only become immune to universal values, their moral views, too, have been gravely distorted.


The New York Times report that invited hatred

On October 26 this year, the New York Times published a report, Family of Wen Jiabao Holds a Hidden Fortune. Since then, the paper that has always had good credibility became target of continuous questioning from Chinese media groups, both inside China and abroad. On October 29, PEOPLES.COM ran an article that said in recent years the New York Times has several scandals and its reputation fell. Some overseas Chinese media, too, persistently declared that the New York Times has become involved in the power struggle in China and has not been objective. Some fans of Wen Jiabao said that, even if what was reported was real, it shouldn't be made public at such a sensitive time. Compared with the more important line-struggle, anti-corruption should be given a back seat. Some others just came up with a whole set of excuses for Wen. Apart from repeating the remarks that Premier Wen has no idea about what his family do, and should not be held responsible; some simply said that Wen has advocated reform for years, it is not appropriate to nail him for corruption, a mistake that every senior official has made.

Why did this New York Times story invite so much hatred?

If it is because this exposure made the paper involve in power struggle in China, then the New York Times is not the only foreign media to have done this. Since March this year, almost all major media organizations around the world found themselves become passively involved in the power struggle at the highest levels in China. From the U.S. to Europe, which key media outlets had not reported the avalanche of scandals about Bo Xilai family that was hard to verify? Why was this same kind of “involvement” or “manipulation” not criticized in a similar fashion?

Clearly, becoming involved in power struggle at the top in China was not what mattered. What mattered was that Wen Jiabao the good Premier of the people must be left unscathed. In the hearts of these people, moral standard is adjustable for different persons, it does not matter what the truth is, it does matter that the image of the sacred idol in their mind remains intact.

The New York Times was not the first to expose the fortune of Wen Jiabao’s family. Reuters and Financial Times had reports on this before, why were those reports not a problem? Why was it not okay to report this in the “sensitive period” before the 18th National Party Congress began? The so-called “sensitive period” was defined based on the needs of the CPC itself and used to regulate domestic media. In the “sensitive period”, media should discipline themselves, toe the line, put the Party’s needs first and act with the political big picture in mind. Media groups inside China were forced to comply with this, overseas Chinese people and Chinese media, too, consciously do the same. 

Apart from disciplining themselves, these media groups intended to expand this regulation to U.S. media. The New York Times came under fire because it took no heed of what Beijing disliked, and published in the “sensitive period” an article that unveiled the “secret assets” of the family of the “people’s good Premier”. The credibility of the newspaper, the business ethics and professionalism of the journalist himself were questioned out of nothing.

"Mindset with Chinese characteristics” at work

I thought this over and over, and eventually came to conclusion that the “mindset with Chinese characteristics” was at work.

To start with, the “mouthpiece theory”—the CPC perception of media as propaganda tools—has become deeply ingrained in the majority of the Chinese people. In one of his article politics scholar Wu Guoguang wrote in an inspiring way about this “mouthpiece theory”. 

He argued that:—
The mouthpiece theory has not only vividly and concisely reflected the truth—and the first thing those who study media of China must understand—that Chinese media outlets are messengers of the CPC, but also directly indicated the basic principle that media cannot report facts with objectivity....In other words, the CPC does not want media to fulfill the function of letting the people to fully understand things that are going on; it only wants the media to be capable of disseminating its views.
It is precisely in this sense that the CPC attaches great importance to “propaganda”, to it the mass media is nothing more propaganda tool. Since [the mass media is expected to] publicize the Party's view, it of course should be reined in by the Party. Here the distortion of objective facts and the tight control of the media came together. 
In fact, controlled media are bound to distort facts; and fact-distorting reports are surely a reflection of the unique intention of the political controller of the media. The two fused together perfectly in this “mouthpiece theory”.

Although the New York Times report enabled readers to fully understand “facts of things that are going on”, the facts provided did not suit the needs of some of the readers in China. Therefore, they said the New York Times interfered with China’s power struggle at a “sensitive period”, and hence they concluded that the report was not objective, or one written with ulterior motives, a tool used by the gang of Bo Xilai.

Think beneath the surface and one could realize that the “mouthpiece theory” was at work. John Thomson, resident director of Beijing Center, University of California Center in China, recalled that after the launch of Reform and Opening in China, he asked [a group of] mainland Chinese editors, “What do you want to see in New York?” One of the senior said, “We go to New York mainly to find out how the party committee of New York City controls the New York Times.” Thomson replied with a laugh that, “there are two major parties in America, the New York Times belongs to neither, and it is not linked to the government.” 

None of them believed what he said.

While the Chinese people today do not make silly mistakes like this, deep down their hearts many still perceive media as “propaganda apparatus” and not “public instrument”. As a propaganda apparatus, media outlets would of course not need to base their reports on facts; to suite the needs of the interest group—the CPC, even if lies are fabricated would still be acceptable. But as public instrument, respect for facts comes first, and then the professional ethics of the media has to be upheld.

The animal farm of China

In the Animal Farm, George Orwell used a flock of sheep that blindly obeyed the pigs (the rulers) as the metaphor for the crowd. This flock of sheep knew nothing else but to bleat the truth that the pigs taught them: “all animals are born equal, but some are more equal than others”.

Now in this animal farm of China, sheep are capable of creating a new slogan, “corruption is bad, but corruption of some good pigs is acceptable”. Judging from the reactions of some of the overseas Chinese media toward the New York Times report about the fortune of Wen's family, one could conclude that for media as a public instrument to exist in China, even if some of the media practitioners are ready, the public at large would still need to go through an adaptation process—they like propaganda apparatus better.

In the darkness of reality, many Chinese have lost the courage to face the truth. I have said many times before that the yearning for "good monarchs and competent prime ministers/premiers" is an everlasting complex in the hearts of the Chinese people. They have had high hopes for Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Zhu Rongji, Hu Jintao, and Wen Jiabao. 

Today, to many Chinese people Wen Jiabao is the only incumbent premier that is competent; he is light, he is hope, he is everything. In other words, Wen Jiabao is not just a green leaf these people find on the decaying tree of the CPC, he is the symbol of hope to bring the tree back to life. If someone tells them that the green leaf was planted there artificially, the result would definitely be like what Russian poet Mikhail Lermontov depicted in the Prophet:—

Then I began to promulgate
The clear love's and truth's commandment:
At me all humans threw for that
Hard sticks and stones, like the madmen.

In this animal farm of China, which was built over 60 years ago, it is far more difficult to make the rulers and the common people embrace such values as democracy, freedom and human rights than to fight against corruption. 

Throughout human history, corruption is seen as a crime in all civilized societies. Now that the hidden wealth of the Wen family came to light, the opportunistic tendency of the Chinese people—chiefly overseas Chinese media and dissidents who enjoy freedom of speech—has finally been fully exposed. The tendency is manifested by the double standard in judging themselves and others, by proposing that “corruption of some good pigs is acceptable”, by seeing media as mouthpiece and not public instrument so on and so forth. These are enough to illustrate that the difficulties China has in embracing universal values are not just because of the hindrance from the CPC, but also a result of the psychological character of the Chinese people.