Populism or Democracy, which would decide the future of China.
By He Qinglian on June 14, 2012.
Sun
Yat-sen had once referred “the People’s livelihood”, “the People’s
identity” and “the People’s rights” collectively as the “Three
Principles of the People”, which was at one point the main theme of the
Chinese pursuit of a bright future in the 20th century.
However,
in authoritarian and totalitarian countries where there is a lack of
civil awareness, “the People’s identity” theory could easily be turned
into senseless xenophobia; “the People’s livelihood” theory, [a negative
form of] populism; and “the People’s rights” theory, which is the
prerequisite for protecting the people’s livelihood and ensuring both
the state and the populace would grow rich, could be swept aside with
extreme ease.
It’s been over six decades since the Communist Party established its rule. Whether it was Mao Zedong’s “struck down the local tyrants and divide their land” or Deng Xiaoping’s “Develop the economy is the absolute principle”, both set out to improve the people’s livelihood.
To
this day, “the people’s rights” theory has not yet been put into
practice; the discussion on democracy is, in the eyes of the
authorities, something very dreadful.
The
way to promote nationalism and to protect the livelihood of the people
differs completely between democratic and authoritarian countries. In
democratic countries, nationalism is purely a form of political
expression the citizens make out of their own accord, and the people’s
livelihood is part of the economic rights—both are citizen rights
guaranteed by the democratic institution. Without a democratic
institution in place, citizen rights would be like a forest without
trees.
In
authoritarian countries, however, the people’s livelihood often has to rely on
the benevolence and enlightenment of the rulers. For example, in the
late 1970s, it dawned on the authorities that the aftermath of the
Cultural Revolution was the nation being reduced to dire destitution,
and that the most important thing was to keep the people well fed, they
therefore began to allow the development of commodity economy, the
opening of farmer’s markets at villages, and moving step by step onto
the path of government-controlled market economy.
Nationalism is frequently used to divert domestic dissatisfaction and serve diplomatic purposes.
Putin’s
power politics was built upon the foundation of populism and
nationalism. But since Russia has already entered the phase of
enlightened despotism, political leaders must go through the procedure
of democratic election. At the end of the day, the people’s opinion
would still be able to manifest itself through votes, even if those
votes are “purchased” or manipulated.
The
“Putin Youth Brigade” support Putin for two reasons. First, they want
to see their country becomes more powerful. Second, they want the
Westerners to stop making indiscreet remarks about Russian politics. It
is claimed on some Chinese websites that the brigade has a song which
translation would read: “15 years ago when our country was reduced to
rubble, they (the Westerners) mocked us. Our parents lost their life
savings, they had no pension, no future. Now we get back on our feet
again. Now we will act. Now we will become stronger. For our fathers had
shed their blood and made sacrifice to defend our motherland!”
When
Yeltsin was in office, Russia was caught in a hyperinflation, the
Russian living standard declined rapidly. After Putin assumed office, he
quickly reversed the economic situation of Russia by making use of the
quality natural resources of Russia and the upward momentum of oil
price.
The lyrics cited above illustrated that votes for Putin came from his solution to the people’s livelihood problems, allowing the people to see the hope of Russia becoming a powerful nation.
But
China’s populism and nationalism are founded on the self-deception of
the believers. Unlike Putin, the authorities do not need to buy over the
people with social welfare, economic benefit, and employment prospect
for young people.
To handle people of different levels, the Beijing authorities would use different approaches masterfully.
When
all kinds of criticism against the authorities are being suppressed,
the Leftist intellectuals, old and new, are allowed a window, a room for
activities specially to themselves. These intellectuals see as their
mission the elimination of dissent, a fact proven by the “war of words”
between new Leftists and liberals in the past decade or so. The
authorities handicapped the liberals, allowing the leftists to attack
freely, and thus the liberals were defeated, many intellectuals who
claimed they were of that camp defected in succession.
Without
doubt, the authorities do not like the fond memories the bottom of
society has of Mao Zedong. Nonetheless, they make use of it wherever it
is possible.
What
the authorities do not like about these people is that they use
commemoration of Mao Zedong as a pretext to criticize the current
affairs. Their xenophobic sentiment, on the other hand, is quite useful
in the eyes of the authorities.
In
addition, the government and the Maoists from the public often tacitly
play with each other “games of stupid pretense”. Members of the public
who took part in playing stupid would, despite knowing that the
government of one-party dictatorship is looting from them their living
resources like their land and homes, pretend to believe (or perhaps
truly think) that the central government is good, the bad guys are the
local governments.
This
“game of stupid pretense” continued until the last two years, resulting
in a political spectacle like this: some people chose to see Wen Jiabao
as the leader of the reformist faction within the Party, he achieved
nothing was only due to the many a restrictions and hindrance from the
conservatives inside the Party.
Even
when they heard news about Wen’s wife and children making huge profits
from their businesses, these people would rather believe those news were
but libels from Wen’s political rivals.
And
another group of people chose to believe that Bo Xilai initiated the
“singing the Red and hitting the black” campaign was out of his
consideration for the bottom of society. The belief these people held is
itself a paradox. The current institution allows officials to collude
with business to plunder the people. And these people are placing their
hope for the future on Mao Zedong, the creator of that institution.
Pretending not to see the various state crimes that Mao personally
committed, they pictured Mao’s era to be a time of equality and
fairness, in which every one had a job (the truth was that even the
workers—a 'privileged group' at that time—had to fight life and death
to get a job), and all had access to free medical care.
These imagination they use as analgesics.
The
inevitable corollary of a populism that breeds from survival anxiety
would be the expectation of political strongman. Originally, the
populism that was hugely influential in Russia held very high moral
standard for the leaders. But to this day, practically none of those who
emerged from the filthy soil of China after some muddy fight(s) could
meet that standard. Nonetheless, not a few Chinese people manage to
deceive themselves and whitewash the leaders in their hearts. This type
of mentality, whether you call it cynicism or the “Ah Q spirit”, is the
mentality of the people of China.
Twenty-three
years have passed since June Fourth. Looking back at the process the
Chinese government interacted with the public in these 23 years, one
could clearly see a theme: in the early years of the 1990s, Deng
Xiaoping relaunched the economic reform through his speech made in the
South and provided the fellow Chinese people with a dose of mental
analgesics.
Over
a period of time, views like “students made mistakes, too; the
crackdown was caused by their refusal to leave the Square” and “look
forward” became the mainstream opinion.
In
the economists circle, absurd theories like “to disintegrate the old
system with corruption would be the least costly and the most effective”
made a glamorous entrance to the hall of academia.
During
the aughts of the twenty-first century, with the CPC becoming
increasingly more powerful, both domestic dissidents and the United
States, which is concerned about the human rights and political
situation of China, thought unanimously that it was possible to nudge
the CPC to embark on the road to rule of law with a gentle approach. And
so inside China there was the saying of “upholding the constitution and
protecting our rights”, which became the predominant form of rights
protection and protests within the legal framework.
The
most important feature of these activities is that they make no mention
of political rights, such as the rights of casting the ballot, of
demonstration and assembly, the freedom of association and the freedom
of the press, and focus on economic rights (such as interests of the
damage caused by land grabbing, demolition and removal) and judicial
complaints from the victims.
With difficulty, this approach continued until the outbreak of Arab Spring in 2011, when it basically could make no more move. After
the real human rights lawyers had experienced repeated suppression, the
bottom of society had no choice but to pin their hopes on the return of
Mao Zedong. The popularity Bo Xilai had came precisely from the
populism that was caused by survival anxiety, which so severe that
people had no time to identify the real political intent of Bo.
The
fact that the Chinese people want change is plainly obvious. The
question is, whether this desire for change is driven by survival
anxiety or rights consciousness would be a key factor that determine the
way future China would develop. If the desire for change is driven by
survival anxiety, then it would be subsided by resource redistribution
implemented through power politics. But if that desire is driven by
rights consciousness, then nothing less than an institutional reform
would meet the demand of the people.
Generally,
the public is short-sighted. Even in the democratic country of Greece,
its people would place their welfare above the future of their country.
Under the totalitarian regime of China, it would be more easily for
populism to cut corners and take the road of combining with the power
that be.
Populism
and democracy, which one would be in control of China in future? The
answer to this question is relevant to China’s ability to break free
from the shackle of dictatorship. Regarding this issue, I do not feel
optimistic—so long as the soil that cultivates populism-cum-nationalism
exists, then even if Bo Xilai is gone from the political arena,
politicians of his kind would remain out there in China.
[End of the trilogy.]
