This is an abridged
translation of two articles by He Qinglian in March 2013.
Links to original articles:
While the annual “Two Sessions” in Beijing is nothing more than an
“elite gathering” through which the authorities manifest the size of the legislative
body and the united front, it nonetheless captivates the attention of media
around the world. The clothes those delegates wear, the demeanor and proposals
they make, and the way they answer questions from reporters could all
constitute a final public opinion test of theirs. The comments on the representatives
of the “Two Sessions” are the true expression of the people’s opinions.
The speech delivered by Zhong Nanshan, Wu Jinglian and Feng
Xiaogang during the “Two Sessions”, as well as the tax anxiety caused by the
promulgation of Guowutiao (“five [new real property] directives
of the State Council) reflected precisely the mixed feelings the Chinese have
for the country's future, the hopes and fears they have in the coming decade.
People inside the system dread revolution.
A veteran economist who enjoys great respect from inside the
Communist Party of China (CPC), Wu Jinglian feels safe discussing during an
interview the market-oriented economic reform, the implementation of the rule
of law and democratization. The considerably lengthy interview carrying the
title that was to the point (“We people inside the system have no stomach for
revolution”) focused on two topics: the change in economic growth model and
potential crises.
In that interview was a paragraph of remarks that summed up the
problems quite well: —
Now there are two
questions that we cannot evade. First, there is no way to get around the old
model of growth. The calls for a change in the way of economic growth have been
there for a decade or two already, the problems intensified. Speaking from the
shallow perspective, that means shortage of resources and the resulting damages
to the environment; viewed from a deeper perspective, that means a low increase
in the income of the workforce. To keep up the growth rate by printing massive
amount of money has resulted in the formation of real property bubble.
Inflation pressure rises continuously; our money in circulation at the moment
would soon reach 200% of the GDP, whereas few countries would exceed 100%.
Second, the corruption issue exacerbates after power entered the field of
economy. Now it is deep in the bone marrow.
What is new in the interview was that he talked about the “reform
consensus” that was formed only last year.
By consensus I mean that social conflicts have already reached a
critical point and that reform must be restarted. In the past, some of my
similar comments received more objections than approvals. This time 90% of
responses were approvals. That is what I mean by “consensus”.
We people inside the system do not want to see revolution. We hope
for stability. As a researcher, I could only do what I could instead of
guessing whether or not I could make it. However, I am fully aware that without
reform, there would be no way out.
The two issues Mr. Wu
discussed were nothing new. For years I have been studying them and I have
answers to them in my heart. Let's just skip corruption—a political cancer
already incurable—and focus on the problem of economic growth model. The
Chinese government had at a point the intention to make changes to it. Back at
the beginning of 2007, the government of Guangdong province contemplated an
introduction of “new birds” (new industries and new source of growth) to
replace the old ones. Yet the result was: the “old birds” flew away, and no “new
birds” came.
The reasons for this
outcome were multifarious, ranging from the system environment that led to high
management costs including the staggering cost of communication with the
government; and tax policy, land prices, and labor costs that became increasingly
detrimental to investors. And the deeper reason was that China has been a
country known for its intellectual property infringement. Over 30 years of
economic development bred a cluster of speculators instead of its own
technological strength.
After the loss of the
two “advantages” of cheap labor force and the low business overhead that did
not have to include the damage done to the environment, two parts of the
“troika” that drove the economy flamed out one after another since 2008,
leaving only real property as the engine of China’s economy. Thus in recent
years Beijing has shown no restraint in pumping astronomical amount of money
into the economy to stimulate it.
I am convinced that
even if a consensus that “reform is needed” would form inside the top
leadership of the CPC, there would still be disagreement as to the direction of
reform and how to initiate one. Xi Jinping’s main tasks at the moment are
taking over the powers and gradually eliminating conflicts of interests within
the CPC. I guess the motion of reform would enter Xi’s agenda only after Li
Keqiang’s “new urbanization plan” has failed. After all, a “violent revolution”
from the bottom of society has not yet materialized; it is merely a potential
threat.
Environmental fear, a
common social fear that transcends classes.
Among the many
delegates attending the “Two Sessions” who shared the concern about the
environment, academician Zhong Nanshan was most troubled by the issue. In his
speech, Zhong said that in the past he thought environment issues were distant
ones that needed to take care of once in a while; now when the basic survival
needs of the people are threatened by environment issues; they have already
turned into crises.
Indeed, the damages
environmental pollution has on human health would take time to surface. The
wealth the Chinese people now enjoy is unprecedented in 5000 years. This
affluence is, however, obtained at a price of ecological environment overdraft
that would lead to the country facing a predicament that is not seen throughout
its 5000 years of history: not only has China become a major importer of food,
oil, iron ore and other resources around the world as its domestic resources
are insufficient to support the survival of its people, but it has also safety
problems with water, air and food when it comes the basic living of the Chinese
people.
I have stated in my
analysis before that China's environmental pollution is a “tragedy of the
commons” that could chiefly be attributed to the collaboration between a
corrupt government and unscrupulous corporations to seek profit; and it
resulted partly from the spontaneous attitude of the Chinese people when it
comes to garbage disposal.
The damages done to
China's ecological environment are so severe that it could not be restored
through punishment of corrupt officials and unscrupulous business owners. Zhang
Lijun, retired Deputy chief of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, has
finally admitted that the cost to restore Huaihe River to its original state
would be tens of thousands times of the GDP the paper mills there generate.
What worries Wu
Jinglian is the prospect of the demise of the Party, of which he is a member
after all; and the thing that worries Zhong Nanshan is the environment and
ecology, a worry about the survival of humankind that is above social
hierarchy. Yet another type of worry is the possible resurgence of the Cultural
Revolution, as reflected in a speech by film director Feng Xiaogang.
Hopes and fears of
China’s Middle Class.
At the discussion
panel of the literary circles, Feng suggested that the authorities have a
strategic vision when it screens movies topics and he expressed wishes that he
could make a film about topics such as the Cultural Revolution which would be
for reflection purposes. He said:
If you don't let the young people today
understand the Cultural Revolution and the disasters the riots of the Red
Guards brought about, then should a new riot take place, people would rise at a
call and would still think that smashing shops windows with bricks is a cool
thing to do.
The deeper message
that Feng intended to convey was not suitable to express during the “Two
Sessions”. Nonetheless, he did so through another channel. There was a feature
interview with Feng that is worth a read: “How many 18
years a person has?”. In the interview, Feng specially mentioned the
relationship between the landlords and the peasants, and described the details
of how a landlord family got robbed of everything by the hungry people.
The director said: —
The answers to these seemingly isolated
incidents that appeared to be absurd could be found in our national character.
This was the core reason I made this film; it was also the core content of the
novel about the famine in 1942. In the past we would blame the system or the
political party for plights in which people had to struggle to survive. But if
you read that novel or watch my movie, you would realize that on many occasions
it was caused by problems with the national character per se.
Scenes like these
repeatedly occurred in times of calamity, or when dynasties neared their end.
The landlords being collectively annihilated were common scenes of the CPC's “Land
Reform” in the 1950s. Perhaps because his movie touched on these historical
incidents, Feng wrote in his Netease Weibo that “People naively thought that
their days would be better if the landlords in their villages were killed.
Following the implementation of the 'Land Reform', heads of landlords were
rolling on the ground. And what happened? Did the peasants end their poverty?
Now it seems the notion of killing landlords is gaining momentum again.
Landlords might as well be careful: your safe days are numbered.”
What the director
meant by “landlords” was of course not in the term's literal meaning. What he meant
by it was those individuals who became rich through various channels since the
economic reform.
Are the worries of
Feng Xiaogang groundless? No. The hate-the-rich-and-the-successful sentiment is
spreading all over China, which could be perceived by anyone who is not numb.
This is the background of Wu Jinglian's remark: “we people inside the system do
not want revolution.” What does “revolution” mean? Mao Zedong had said long
ago: a violent action with which one class overthrow another.
National Character
and National Memory.
The advices from Wu
Jinglian and Zhong Nanshan had a specific target: the Chinese government. Words
from Feng Xiaogang, though, were a reflection on the national character of the
Chinese people. Thus his remarks were directed at almost everyone in China.
It was both fortunate
and unfortunate that I myself came to realize this terrible national character
long ago. In 1968 I saw with my eyes the corpses of the people labeled as the
“black five categories” and their families who were butchered by the “Supreme
Court of the impoverish peasants" of Shaoyang county, Hunan province. I
learned later that mass slaughter did not just occur in Shaoyang county, it took place in
Guangxi province, Dao county, Hunan, and the junction of
the three provinces of Hunan, Guangxi, and Guangdong. Unlike the riots of the
hungry people that took place throughout the history of China that disturbed
Feng, these incidents of mass slaughter were arbitrary massacre of the
“untouchables” committed by a portion of the Chinese people who considered themselves
politically superior in peaceful times.
From those corpses drifting
along the Zijiang river one could tell that the victims had been subjected to
inhuman torture before they died. From then on I came to pay close attention to
wherefrom those peasants acquired their knowledge of using torture. I learned
afterward from a book about 'Land Reform' at Laohuping in the 1950s that
killings of similar fashion had happened. As more and more historical data
about the Cultural Revolution (including the ugly and shocking past of
cannibalism in Guangxi), the 'Land Reform', and in particular the several
peasant movements led by the CPC got unearthed later on, I became fully aware
of the fate that awaits my nation.
The true is, the fact
that 'killing landlords' became a notion deeply ingrained in the mind of the
Chinese people is not phenomenon that emerged only in recent years. Firstly,
there is historical background to it. For example, a group of bandits in
Shandong half a century ago would justify their actions of looting and other
crimes by saying “the people of the upper class owe us money”; and then there
was an event as recalled by Marshal Ye Jianying's daughter: during the Cultural
Revolution, Mao Zedong received the Red Guards. After the Red Guards dismissed,
there were gold bars all over the place. It was said that those were seized
from households during raids. It could be seen from this that the Chinese have
never been cured from the tendency to loot. When given the opportunity, this
demon lurking in the hearts of the Chinese people would come alive.
Secondly,
the nation lends theoretical foundation from the class struggle education since
the CPC established its rule and the yet-to-abandon Marxist theory of
“capitalist exploitation”.
Thirdly, there are realistic reasons behind it as
the CPC privileged group and its officials have been amassing wealth in a
frenzied manner to the extent of disregarding the life and death of others. They
became wealthy by means of land grab, forced demolition and the destruction of
environment. The notion “people of the upper class owe us money”, a natural
conclusion drawn from the fact of the privileged plunder of the wealth of the
common people, has long been popular. Unlike their predecessors, the people at
the bottom of society in today's China are able to express themselves in a more
refined fashion using such ideological language as those from Marxist theories,
and Mao's thoughts.
In societies where
the upward mobility channel is smooth, those at the bottom would find ways to
make progress, so as to become members of the middle class or even upper class,
as was the case for China during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. But
when that channel is severely blocked, when even the opportunity of joining the
army comes with a price tag, those at the bottom feel despair. Without hope,
all that is left with them is hatred. Many people are worried that Jasmine
Revolution would break out in China. However, if China could get to complete
its transition to democracy through such a revolution, even at the cost of a
short-term civil war like that of Libya, it would still be the best outcome for
China.
Back in 1949 when the change in regimes took place, China had
green mountains, clean water, and clear skies despite all the damages resulted
from war. Now, with cancer villages all across the country, and with smog
shrouding its skies, the people of China have come to realize that they have
already lost their home, both in the material and the spiritual senses. Many
are perhaps thinking to themselves: would the ending of China
Tidal Wave, a novel by Wang Lixiong, unfold in
China?
