Source article in Chinese: 习近平：权位之重仅次于毛泽东的独裁者
By He Qinglian on November 13, 2013
For the Communist Party of China (CPC), the biggest political achievement of the Third Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee is that a National Security Committee would be created to improve the national security system and strategy. According to the political logic of the CPC, “l'Etat est le Parti”, the so-called national security means nothing other than the security of the red regime. Whatever reform policies the so-called “reform group” may put forward in future serve only to safeguard that regime.
Showing posts with label Xi Jinping. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Xi Jinping. Show all posts
Xi Jinping: slave to the CPC political system
By He Qinglian on November 9, 2013
Source article in Chinese: 习近平：中共政治制度的奴隶
There was no signal that a political reform would be initiated before the Third Plenum of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) convened. Nonetheless, overseas media outlets still sought to speculate Xi Jinping's political motives from the suspension of publication of the Little Red Book, and Xi's stopping short of paying homage to Mao's ancestral home in Shaoshan and the like. Some of those who have high expectation of Xi thought that, the General Secretary hasn't found a direction after he assumed office more than one year ago and his swaying political attitude upset the leftists, the rightists and the princelings alike—a judgment that seems to indicate the top leader of the CPC has made many enemies in both the government and the public. This remark has got the situation wrong in that its premise erroneously mistook autocracy that worships power for democracy and assumed that those disgruntled members in the ruling clique could become Xi Jinping's opponents.
Source article in Chinese: 习近平：中共政治制度的奴隶
There was no signal that a political reform would be initiated before the Third Plenum of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) convened. Nonetheless, overseas media outlets still sought to speculate Xi Jinping's political motives from the suspension of publication of the Little Red Book, and Xi's stopping short of paying homage to Mao's ancestral home in Shaoshan and the like. Some of those who have high expectation of Xi thought that, the General Secretary hasn't found a direction after he assumed office more than one year ago and his swaying political attitude upset the leftists, the rightists and the princelings alike—a judgment that seems to indicate the top leader of the CPC has made many enemies in both the government and the public. This remark has got the situation wrong in that its premise erroneously mistook autocracy that worships power for democracy and assumed that those disgruntled members in the ruling clique could become Xi Jinping's opponents.
Xi Jinping’s “Speech 8.19” misinterpreted
By He Qinglian on September 8, 2013.
Source Article in Chinese: 被左右两方曲解的习近平“8.19讲话”
The recent debate about constitutionalism is very lively. While Maoists and Leftists took Xi Jinping’s remarks that showed his admiration for Mao as indications of a full turn to the left; the pro-constitutionalism faction (aka the “faction of universal values”) expected the Communist Party of China (CPC) to put political reform on the agenda during the Third Plenum this fall. And so the two factions talked past each other, oblivious to the strong political signal Xin Jinping released in his speech “Ideology work is a paramount task of the Party” (known among the Chinese media circle as “Speech 8.19”) and continued to make interpretation following their wishes.
Source Article in Chinese: 被左右两方曲解的习近平“8.19讲话”
Could Xi Jinping become another Mao Zedong?
Source article in Chinese: 以毛式铁腕捍卫权贵资本主义——习近平的执政蓝图（一）
By He Qinglian on May 14, 2013.
It's been over a half year since Xi Jinping began his reign. The ruling blueprint he has is very clear: he sees as his political mission acting as a “guardian of the Red Regime”. Facing the facts, even the most tenacious dreamers found it hard to continue their argument that Xi Jinping would engage in the so-called “great cause of political democratization reform”.
Recently, a “Briefing on the current state of ideological sphere”, issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, is being circulated on the internet. Since the file number of that document is “GO-2013-9”, it is known as “document no. 9” for short. Allegedly the document has already been distributed to the county and regiment levels; in Chongqing, Jilin and other provinces and cities there are reports about studying of “document no.9”.
By He Qinglian on May 14, 2013.
It's been over a half year since Xi Jinping began his reign. The ruling blueprint he has is very clear: he sees as his political mission acting as a “guardian of the Red Regime”. Facing the facts, even the most tenacious dreamers found it hard to continue their argument that Xi Jinping would engage in the so-called “great cause of political democratization reform”.
“Document no. 9”.
Recently, a “Briefing on the current state of ideological sphere”, issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, is being circulated on the internet. Since the file number of that document is “GO-2013-9”, it is known as “document no. 9” for short. Allegedly the document has already been distributed to the county and regiment levels; in Chongqing, Jilin and other provinces and cities there are reports about studying of “document no.9”.
Xi Jinping's Dilemma
Xi Jinping's Dilemma: to fight corruption or not to fight?
Original Article in Chinese: 习总的哈姆雷特之困：反腐败，还是不反？
By He Qinglian on January 30, 2013
Lately, CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping is caught in a Hamlet dilemma. The question on his mind, though, is not "to be or not to be", it is about fighting corruption.
By fighting corruption it could mean a general anti-corruption campaign or one that focuses on a small area; it could also imply a campaign with actions to be taken in full force or with some restraint.
To be fair, “not to fight corruption” is truly not what’s on Xi Jinping’s mind. Otherwise, he would not have personally led five other CPCCC Standing Committee members to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), an organ oversaw by Wang Qishan, to deliver his speech that he would "catch both tigers and flies" when fighting corruption and corrupt officials, regardless of the scale of the bribe they took and their social prestige, would not escape punishment.
That speech was, in all probability, an attempt to correct Wang’s comment earlier that the anti-corruption campaign should be gentle and low-key. However, the dilemma Xi is facing is that there is an overwhelming number of both large and small bribe-takers—"tigers" and "flies"—in the government, and it is difficult to determine where and how to strike. Apartments owned by officials are but an example of a problem impossible to address.
The dramas triggered to officials' apartments in China are related to the economy and politics. And since these dramas are also relevant to the people's livelihood, they have become aggregation points for people's grievances. As a result, the anti-corruption campaign in China's officialdom and the mass selling of real property from late November 2012 could be likened to a two-act play in which officials assume the leading role and their apartments served as the predominant props.
The first act began when the so-called “the apartment families” that were exposed by an internet anti-corruption campaign in late November 2012. In the twenty-odd days to follow, netizens across the country took the opportunity to report officials of middle and low rankings who processed a dozen or even more than twenty luxury apartments. Based on the age and gender of those officials, they were dubbed “apartment uncle”, “apartment grandpa”, “apartment auntie”, “apartment sister”, “apartment girl” and “apartment ancestor” (!). Officials included in this list have at least a dozen apartments to their names. The most noticeable “apartment ancestor” at the moment is Cheng Shaochun, chief of Licheng District Public Security branch bureau, Jinan city, Shandong, who reportedly owns 16 luxury apartment complexes—not just apartments, but apartment complexes.
With reference to the property price in China, it is nearly impossible for the country's officials, regardless of their ranks, to purchase commodity flats using their salary alone, not to mention owning ten-odd or even dozens of apartments.
Without doubt, these apartments are related to their owners' acts of corruption.
Once dawned on the mind of those officials that their assets could come to light at any moment and would be used as the target to fight corruption, the apartments these officials used to see as the symbol of their wealth are now “risk assets”. The officials and their family became anxious about their apartments.
And so the second act of the play began. In dozens of cities across China there have been selling of apartments en masse.
According to a circular by the CCDI, the statistics prepared by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) and the Ministry of Supervision has it that 60% of the luxury apartments and mansions sold were owned in anonymity, using pseudonyms or corporate names. All of the sellers requested payment be made in cash and the money not to be wired via financial institutions; the selling of the property was done solely by lawyers and the owners did not show up in the entire transaction process.
After checking the initial purchase records and movements of capital between accounts, it was found that some of the owners who sold their property are public servants or in the rank of senior management in state-owned enterprises.
Allegedly, by mid-December, the CCDI, the General Office of the CPC, and the Organization Department of the CPCCC have already summoned over 120 senior officials currently in office to instruct them to tell their family to stop underselling property and closing bank accounts registered in anonymity or using pseudonym.
The anxiety caused by the apartment issue has eventually become the worries of the Party and the government. The CCDI circular has also listed the counts of recent withdrawal of foreign currency by the family members of middle and high-ranking public officials of Party and government organs in nine provinces and municipalities directly under the Central Government: Tianjin, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, and Hubei.
Guangdong topped the list with a withdrawal amount of 1.792 billion US dollar; and the lowest was 370 million US dollars. The CCDI circular stated that, according to incomplete statistics, the amount of illegal capital outflow in 2010 was 412 billion US dollars (6.9% of the year's GDP of 5.98 trillion US dollars); in 2011 the number reached 600 billion (8% of the year's GDP of 7.49 trillion US dollars); in 2012, the number was projected to exceed one trillion US dollars (12% of the year's GDP of 8.23 trillion US dollars); in 2013, the scale of illegal capital outflow is expected to reach 1.5 trillion (based on the annual GDP growth rate of 7%, that would approximately be 17% of the year's GDP of 8.8 trillion.)
The worries of the Party and the government are of course not just limited to this. When the officials undersell their apartments, it means they would not become new buyers of real property in future. And this is relevant to the smooth implementation of future economic development plan—the new urbanization project, I would present my analysis of this in a separate article.
Judging from the Economic Observer report on January 18, the CCDI has a fairly accurate understanding of the number of apartments owned by officials across the country. It was several years ago when the MOHURD started the establishment of the information system of individual property ownership in 40 cities. The time that system became publicly available for use was, however, postponed time and again. To this date the list of those 40 cities has still not been announced. Reportedly some of the cities have not yet completed the makeup of the housing history archival data. The reasons for the slow progress are that, apart from the complexity of the data entry work, the project encountered invisible boycott from officials of various regions.
It was said that to ensure smooth progress of the data entry work, MOHURD Minister Jiang Weixin told senior officials across the country that “the housing data of a particular individual would be retrieved only when there is consent from the Municipal Committee Secretary, the Mayor, and personnel from the MOHURD.”
Deputy Minister of the MOHURD once said that “the data collected from ministries, and provincial (regional) government is for statistical, analytical and aggregation purposes only; apart from local inquiry made in accordance with existing relevant provisions, no other inquiry service would be provided.
The government of the Guangdong province promised that the housing data gathered would be for statistical, analytical and aggregation purposes only, inquiry permission would be set in strict accordance with the relevant provisions.
It is precisely because the data has close relevance to the amount of assets owned by officials that a professor doing a research project of individual housing information system said:
Data entry of individual housing information is a risky job. Officials of the relevant department who have higher “political consciousness” would be reluctant to take this “hot potato”.
Regarding the issue of property ownership alone, there is concrete evidence of corruption of officials across the country, and Xi Jinping has repeatedly expressed his determination to crack down on corruption. Now there is only one problem left: to fight corruption or not to fight.
In view of the people's interests, Xi Jinping has to punish these officials because “he came from the people”, a propaganda highlight of the Xinhua News Agency since Xi ascended to the highest position in November 2012.
And the feature article about Xi Jinping was entitled “the people is the spring of our strength”.
But to make the people feel happy would mean great suffering to the Party cadres. If Xi is serious about fighting corruption, like carrying out the campaign pursuant to the provisions laid out by the Criminal Code, then his every move could be startling.
I did a quick check and found that the Article 383 of the Criminal Code stipulates four levels of meting out punishment on corruption. The lightest punishment would be criminal detention for fewer than two years for taking bribes of less than 5000 yuan; the heaviest sentence would be ten years or life imprisonment and confiscation of property for those who took bribes of more than 100,000 yuan. For cases of particular seriousness, the convicts would be punishable by death and the confiscation of property.
If Xi Jinping truly means to rule by law, then the majority of cadres of numerous Party organs and government departments are likely to get the maximum penalty pursuant to the Criminal Codes about corruption. In that case, how would Party offices and the government function?
Therefore, the "best" way is to hold high the banner of "anti-corruption"—otherwise the Party could hardly face the people, and Xi Jinping would be considered untrustworthy—and secretly amend the Criminal Codes, so that the meshes of the “cage” would be both big and wide, say by allowing every official to own 5 to 20 apartments in accordance with their respective ranks and put forward the crime of “illegally obtaining individual housing data” to deter those troublemakers who dare to leak on the Internet information of assets owned by officials.
In so doing, the “anti-corruption campaign” could achieve instantaneous results and end swiftly. If not, Xi's campaign would end up like the alcohol ban imposed by Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU—scrapped without any success. However, Andropov managed to hunt down a few “tigers” such as the sons- and brothers-in-law of Brezhnev, his predecessor, former General Secretary of the CPSU in his anti-corruption campaign when he newly assumed office.
Original Article in Chinese: 习总的哈姆雷特之困：反腐败，还是不反？
By He Qinglian on January 30, 2013
Lately, CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping is caught in a Hamlet dilemma. The question on his mind, though, is not "to be or not to be", it is about fighting corruption.
By fighting corruption it could mean a general anti-corruption campaign or one that focuses on a small area; it could also imply a campaign with actions to be taken in full force or with some restraint.
To be fair, “not to fight corruption” is truly not what’s on Xi Jinping’s mind. Otherwise, he would not have personally led five other CPCCC Standing Committee members to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), an organ oversaw by Wang Qishan, to deliver his speech that he would "catch both tigers and flies" when fighting corruption and corrupt officials, regardless of the scale of the bribe they took and their social prestige, would not escape punishment.
That speech was, in all probability, an attempt to correct Wang’s comment earlier that the anti-corruption campaign should be gentle and low-key. However, the dilemma Xi is facing is that there is an overwhelming number of both large and small bribe-takers—"tigers" and "flies"—in the government, and it is difficult to determine where and how to strike. Apartments owned by officials are but an example of a problem impossible to address.
The dramas triggered to officials' apartments in China are related to the economy and politics. And since these dramas are also relevant to the people's livelihood, they have become aggregation points for people's grievances. As a result, the anti-corruption campaign in China's officialdom and the mass selling of real property from late November 2012 could be likened to a two-act play in which officials assume the leading role and their apartments served as the predominant props.
The first act began when the so-called “the apartment families” that were exposed by an internet anti-corruption campaign in late November 2012. In the twenty-odd days to follow, netizens across the country took the opportunity to report officials of middle and low rankings who processed a dozen or even more than twenty luxury apartments. Based on the age and gender of those officials, they were dubbed “apartment uncle”, “apartment grandpa”, “apartment auntie”, “apartment sister”, “apartment girl” and “apartment ancestor” (!). Officials included in this list have at least a dozen apartments to their names. The most noticeable “apartment ancestor” at the moment is Cheng Shaochun, chief of Licheng District Public Security branch bureau, Jinan city, Shandong, who reportedly owns 16 luxury apartment complexes—not just apartments, but apartment complexes.
With reference to the property price in China, it is nearly impossible for the country's officials, regardless of their ranks, to purchase commodity flats using their salary alone, not to mention owning ten-odd or even dozens of apartments.
Without doubt, these apartments are related to their owners' acts of corruption.
Once dawned on the mind of those officials that their assets could come to light at any moment and would be used as the target to fight corruption, the apartments these officials used to see as the symbol of their wealth are now “risk assets”. The officials and their family became anxious about their apartments.
And so the second act of the play began. In dozens of cities across China there have been selling of apartments en masse.
According to a circular by the CCDI, the statistics prepared by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) and the Ministry of Supervision has it that 60% of the luxury apartments and mansions sold were owned in anonymity, using pseudonyms or corporate names. All of the sellers requested payment be made in cash and the money not to be wired via financial institutions; the selling of the property was done solely by lawyers and the owners did not show up in the entire transaction process.
After checking the initial purchase records and movements of capital between accounts, it was found that some of the owners who sold their property are public servants or in the rank of senior management in state-owned enterprises.
Allegedly, by mid-December, the CCDI, the General Office of the CPC, and the Organization Department of the CPCCC have already summoned over 120 senior officials currently in office to instruct them to tell their family to stop underselling property and closing bank accounts registered in anonymity or using pseudonym.
The anxiety caused by the apartment issue has eventually become the worries of the Party and the government. The CCDI circular has also listed the counts of recent withdrawal of foreign currency by the family members of middle and high-ranking public officials of Party and government organs in nine provinces and municipalities directly under the Central Government: Tianjin, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, and Hubei.
Guangdong topped the list with a withdrawal amount of 1.792 billion US dollar; and the lowest was 370 million US dollars. The CCDI circular stated that, according to incomplete statistics, the amount of illegal capital outflow in 2010 was 412 billion US dollars (6.9% of the year's GDP of 5.98 trillion US dollars); in 2011 the number reached 600 billion (8% of the year's GDP of 7.49 trillion US dollars); in 2012, the number was projected to exceed one trillion US dollars (12% of the year's GDP of 8.23 trillion US dollars); in 2013, the scale of illegal capital outflow is expected to reach 1.5 trillion (based on the annual GDP growth rate of 7%, that would approximately be 17% of the year's GDP of 8.8 trillion.)
The worries of the Party and the government are of course not just limited to this. When the officials undersell their apartments, it means they would not become new buyers of real property in future. And this is relevant to the smooth implementation of future economic development plan—the new urbanization project, I would present my analysis of this in a separate article.
Judging from the Economic Observer report on January 18, the CCDI has a fairly accurate understanding of the number of apartments owned by officials across the country. It was several years ago when the MOHURD started the establishment of the information system of individual property ownership in 40 cities. The time that system became publicly available for use was, however, postponed time and again. To this date the list of those 40 cities has still not been announced. Reportedly some of the cities have not yet completed the makeup of the housing history archival data. The reasons for the slow progress are that, apart from the complexity of the data entry work, the project encountered invisible boycott from officials of various regions.
It was said that to ensure smooth progress of the data entry work, MOHURD Minister Jiang Weixin told senior officials across the country that “the housing data of a particular individual would be retrieved only when there is consent from the Municipal Committee Secretary, the Mayor, and personnel from the MOHURD.”
Deputy Minister of the MOHURD once said that “the data collected from ministries, and provincial (regional) government is for statistical, analytical and aggregation purposes only; apart from local inquiry made in accordance with existing relevant provisions, no other inquiry service would be provided.
The government of the Guangdong province promised that the housing data gathered would be for statistical, analytical and aggregation purposes only, inquiry permission would be set in strict accordance with the relevant provisions.
It is precisely because the data has close relevance to the amount of assets owned by officials that a professor doing a research project of individual housing information system said:
Data entry of individual housing information is a risky job. Officials of the relevant department who have higher “political consciousness” would be reluctant to take this “hot potato”.
Regarding the issue of property ownership alone, there is concrete evidence of corruption of officials across the country, and Xi Jinping has repeatedly expressed his determination to crack down on corruption. Now there is only one problem left: to fight corruption or not to fight.
In view of the people's interests, Xi Jinping has to punish these officials because “he came from the people”, a propaganda highlight of the Xinhua News Agency since Xi ascended to the highest position in November 2012.
And the feature article about Xi Jinping was entitled “the people is the spring of our strength”.
But to make the people feel happy would mean great suffering to the Party cadres. If Xi is serious about fighting corruption, like carrying out the campaign pursuant to the provisions laid out by the Criminal Code, then his every move could be startling.
I did a quick check and found that the Article 383 of the Criminal Code stipulates four levels of meting out punishment on corruption. The lightest punishment would be criminal detention for fewer than two years for taking bribes of less than 5000 yuan; the heaviest sentence would be ten years or life imprisonment and confiscation of property for those who took bribes of more than 100,000 yuan. For cases of particular seriousness, the convicts would be punishable by death and the confiscation of property.
If Xi Jinping truly means to rule by law, then the majority of cadres of numerous Party organs and government departments are likely to get the maximum penalty pursuant to the Criminal Codes about corruption. In that case, how would Party offices and the government function?
Therefore, the "best" way is to hold high the banner of "anti-corruption"—otherwise the Party could hardly face the people, and Xi Jinping would be considered untrustworthy—and secretly amend the Criminal Codes, so that the meshes of the “cage” would be both big and wide, say by allowing every official to own 5 to 20 apartments in accordance with their respective ranks and put forward the crime of “illegally obtaining individual housing data” to deter those troublemakers who dare to leak on the Internet information of assets owned by officials.
In so doing, the “anti-corruption campaign” could achieve instantaneous results and end swiftly. If not, Xi's campaign would end up like the alcohol ban imposed by Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU—scrapped without any success. However, Andropov managed to hunt down a few “tigers” such as the sons- and brothers-in-law of Brezhnev, his predecessor, former General Secretary of the CPSU in his anti-corruption campaign when he newly assumed office.
Xi Jinping: Guardian of the Red Regime
By
He Qinglian on January 14, 2013.
Many people persistently make remarks that Xi Jinping might or has to initiate political reform. The story that appeared on January 13 in Ming pao should serve to somewhat cool down the wishful thinking of these observers.
Many people persistently make remarks that Xi Jinping might or has to initiate political reform. The story that appeared on January 13 in Ming pao should serve to somewhat cool down the wishful thinking of these observers.
Will Xi Jinping Change China?
西方社会为何亟盼习近平改革？
By He Qinglian on November 15, 2012.
In his address delivered at the 18th Party Congress, Hu Jintao described Western democracy as the evil path. That remark made the Chinese people temporarily stop expecting political reform. Outraged, someone commented that expecting the CPC to carry out political reform is like a new form of Stockholm syndrome which paroxysm would happen en masse every once in a while.
The funny thing is, on the contrary, the international community is developing a “reform expectation syndrome”, and that too is happening en masse.
That article analyzed where Xi Jinping would find his governing inspiration by starting with the assertion that he would not be fond of Mao Zedong, it then proceeded to dig up several positive factors that indicate Xi would lead China into a new era. The factors are as follows.
First, Xi Jinping is more amiable in the eyes of Western countries, in particular the United States, than Hu Jintao. Xi lived with a U.S. household in Muscatine, Iowa when he first visited the United States; his daughter is now studying at Harvard University.
Second, Xi Jinping appears more lovable than Hu Jintao because of his appearance, his voice and his glamorous wife.
And third, the influence of Xi Jinping's father, Xi Zhongxun. Foreign media unanimously see Xi Zhongxun as an economic reformist and comparatively a political liberal. In 1987 he spoke in defense for reformist leader Hu Yaobang, then general secretary that came under fire, and he condemned the Tiananmen incident in 1989.
First, when Xi Jinping was assigned the responsibility to plan and coordinate preparation for the Beijing Olympics in 2008, he and Zhou Yongkang devised together an “Olympics Security Model”, which became known for its all-encompassing strict surveillance with “six nets”. The security model became a precedent for all subsequent major events and conferences in China.
Second, during his visit in Mexico in February 2009, Xi Jinping made a grand statement: “some foreigners with full bellies and nothing better to do engage in finger-pointing at us." He then added, "First, China does not export revolution; second, it does not export famine and poverty; and third, it does not mess around with you. So what else is there to say?”
Third, at the opening ceremony of the Central Party School in early September 2012, Xi Jinping expressed his commendation for Mao Zedong and Mao's thoughts.
This way of deliberately omitting some important facts while over-interpreting others would at most be a reflection of the expectation of the author (and the Western societies) that Xi Jinping initiates political reform. If this WSJ report could be liken to a lollipop that is used to make a child behave, then the Economist article, Xi Jinping: the man who must change China, could be seen as a warning.
Those Chinese people who expect a reforms are out of the same reasons above. Yet the deeper causes that these foreigners expect change are not what the Chinese people could readily think of. For instance, the Economist expressed its worries chiefly on the grounds that “the world has much more to fear from a weak, unstable China than from a strong one”—a stark contrast from the years of propagandist claim of China that “the West (or the U.S.) fears a mighty China”—and what Xi Jinping said in 2009 was actually a response to this worry of Western societies.
Southeast Asian countries neighboring China are where illegal Chinese immigrants head for, Chinese communities, big and small, have been formed. In these communities, the thriving prostitution, mafia, money laundering and drugs are creating serious headache for the police there. These problems have also emerged in Spain, Italy and other countries. These countries worry that, once large scale unrest breaks out in China, illegal Chinese immigrants will be heading for them like tidal waves and would be much more difficult to manage.
The United States realized later on that there are still plenty of small thug regimes creating troubles, and there was no major country that could exert influence on them. And then, the United States figured that China might process this type of influence.
Although China's political influence and controlling power on these countries is nowhere near the former Soviet Union back during the years when the Socialist bloc existed, it sees itself as the big brother of “the club of tyrants”.
The United States understands that China's controlling power falls far short of that of the former Soviet Union, it nonetheless wishes China could play this role. In its fight against terrorism, and in dealing with North Korea and Iran, the United States has this hope for China, that it could become a responsible major power in the international community.
What kind of a path will Xi Jinping lead China onto? The world is watching.
By He Qinglian on November 15, 2012.
In his address delivered at the 18th Party Congress, Hu Jintao described Western democracy as the evil path. That remark made the Chinese people temporarily stop expecting political reform. Outraged, someone commented that expecting the CPC to carry out political reform is like a new form of Stockholm syndrome which paroxysm would happen en masse every once in a while.
The funny thing is, on the contrary, the international community is developing a “reform expectation syndrome”, and that too is happening en masse.
International Expectations
How high an expectation the international community has for Xi Jinping to carry out reform? Let's have a look at a Wall Street Journal article published on November 12, “China's New Boss: Xi Jinping”, which serves together with other articles like “Meet China’s Folk Star First Lady-in-Waiting” as the embodiment of the ongoing hope for change.
That article analyzed where Xi Jinping would find his governing inspiration by starting with the assertion that he would not be fond of Mao Zedong, it then proceeded to dig up several positive factors that indicate Xi would lead China into a new era. The factors are as follows.
First, Xi Jinping is more amiable in the eyes of Western countries, in particular the United States, than Hu Jintao. Xi lived with a U.S. household in Muscatine, Iowa when he first visited the United States; his daughter is now studying at Harvard University.
Second, Xi Jinping appears more lovable than Hu Jintao because of his appearance, his voice and his glamorous wife.
And third, the influence of Xi Jinping's father, Xi Zhongxun. Foreign media unanimously see Xi Zhongxun as an economic reformist and comparatively a political liberal. In 1987 he spoke in defense for reformist leader Hu Yaobang, then general secretary that came under fire, and he condemned the Tiananmen incident in 1989.
Unlikelihood of Changes
While stressing the positive factors that Xi Jinping might lead China into a new era, the commentator made studied omissions of some crucial facts.
First, when Xi Jinping was assigned the responsibility to plan and coordinate preparation for the Beijing Olympics in 2008, he and Zhou Yongkang devised together an “Olympics Security Model”, which became known for its all-encompassing strict surveillance with “six nets”. The security model became a precedent for all subsequent major events and conferences in China.
Second, during his visit in Mexico in February 2009, Xi Jinping made a grand statement: “some foreigners with full bellies and nothing better to do engage in finger-pointing at us." He then added, "First, China does not export revolution; second, it does not export famine and poverty; and third, it does not mess around with you. So what else is there to say?”
Third, at the opening ceremony of the Central Party School in early September 2012, Xi Jinping expressed his commendation for Mao Zedong and Mao's thoughts.
This way of deliberately omitting some important facts while over-interpreting others would at most be a reflection of the expectation of the author (and the Western societies) that Xi Jinping initiates political reform. If this WSJ report could be liken to a lollipop that is used to make a child behave, then the Economist article, Xi Jinping: the man who must change China, could be seen as a warning.
Distressful Signs
The Economist article listed out all unstable factors in China, such as the decelerating economy, social inequality, pervasive corruption, deteriorating environment and officials' grabbing of land by hook and crook. After quoting scholars as saying that China is “unstable at the grass roots, dejected at the middle strata and out of control at the top”, the article continued that “If China’s leaders mishandle the discontent, one senior economist warned in a secret report, it could cause 'a chain reaction that results in social turmoil or violent revolution'”. To avert this, Xi Jinping must initiate change. Recent articles from BBC and the Guardian are basically also of this view.
Those Chinese people who expect a reforms are out of the same reasons above. Yet the deeper causes that these foreigners expect change are not what the Chinese people could readily think of. For instance, the Economist expressed its worries chiefly on the grounds that “the world has much more to fear from a weak, unstable China than from a strong one”—a stark contrast from the years of propagandist claim of China that “the West (or the U.S.) fears a mighty China”—and what Xi Jinping said in 2009 was actually a response to this worry of Western societies.
Fear of an unstable China
Why would the international community worry that turmoil would break out in China? For one reason, China is now in a period of boom that is unprecedented in history. While the country seizes resources around the world by such means as investment in stakes, acquisition with high prices and others, it causes anxiety around the world with its exports of various kinds of bad commodity that are unsafe, its output massive numbers of emigrants by means of human smuggling and others, and the engagement of these Chinese migrants in money laundering.
Southeast Asian countries neighboring China are where illegal Chinese immigrants head for, Chinese communities, big and small, have been formed. In these communities, the thriving prostitution, mafia, money laundering and drugs are creating serious headache for the police there. These problems have also emerged in Spain, Italy and other countries. These countries worry that, once large scale unrest breaks out in China, illegal Chinese immigrants will be heading for them like tidal waves and would be much more difficult to manage.
What is expected of China?
For the United States, there is another concern. If a powerful China could become a responsible member of the international community, then it could perhaps be counted on to control some smaller thug regimes. America as the world leader has long discovered that the situation now is more difficult to address than it was during the “Cold war”. Back then there was the Soviet Union, the big brother of the Socialist bloc, the U.S., Britain, and France needed only to negotiate and reach an agreement with the “big brother”, and then count on it to control its little Socialist brothers. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the evil empire was no more.
The United States realized later on that there are still plenty of small thug regimes creating troubles, and there was no major country that could exert influence on them. And then, the United States figured that China might process this type of influence.
China and its dictatorial friends
What did this influence of China come from? Given that China needs to resist international condemnation of its human rights, it has to form an alliance with some autocratic countries. In addition, China needs resources and has developed all kinds of cooperative economic ties with these countries. The increasingly affluent Beijing is very willing to become “good friends” with these dictatorial countries through aids, and interest-free loans. This alliance of interest acquired with money enables China and its “friends” to successfully resist Western societies' condemnation and sanction against them in UN.
Although China's political influence and controlling power on these countries is nowhere near the former Soviet Union back during the years when the Socialist bloc existed, it sees itself as the big brother of “the club of tyrants”.
The United States understands that China's controlling power falls far short of that of the former Soviet Union, it nonetheless wishes China could play this role. In its fight against terrorism, and in dealing with North Korea and Iran, the United States has this hope for China, that it could become a responsible major power in the international community.
Which way will China go?
And for China to become a responsible player in the international community, it would have to embark on the road of democratization. This time, Hu Jintao's declaration that China would not take the road of Western democratization, and called it the evil path has really disappointed the West. But then what could be done? The European Union is still caught in a crisis that has no end in sight, U.S. economy has yet to fully recover, if Beijing insists to oppress its people, it would definitely lead China to unrest and bring unease to the world.
What kind of a path will Xi Jinping lead China onto? The world is watching.
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