Please Keep Tibet
While attending the Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in D.C. on July 9 and 10, I saw an article by Tibetan female writer Tsering Woeser, “Please Stop the ‘Development’ of Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar for Profit (请制止用神山圣湖牟利的“开发”)". The article stated that the Tibetan Tourism Company, a subsidiary of the Beijing-based Guofeng Company, have been “contracted” to take over the holy Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar, and undertaken the “Tibetan Kailash Manasarovar Tourism Development Project”, exploiting the Holy Mountain and the Sacred Lake of Tibetans as a way to boost shares selling in the company’s public listing.
Woeser opposes commercialization of the sacred land, citing two reasons that the area is not suitable for development: first, Mount Kailash is the holy mountain for the Tibetans, it must not be desecrated; second, environment protection. I completely agreed with her on these two reasons for objection. Yet I am aware that, for the Chinese people who would pray to deities for blessing but have no religious tradition, the first reason would not stop the interested parties. Visiting Mount Kailash has great appeal to Chinese living in inland China.
After spending a long time in jungles of cement and steel with no scents of flowers, no forests, but grey skies, people are fascinated by the idea of polar adventure. And I have serious doubt how big the binding force the reason of environment protection has on the Chinese people. Because the people growing up in the 1960s, and the two or three generations before them, could only watch the country trampled in the name of economic development by the rich and powerful and their stakeholders in the last thirty years: they witness one river after another ends up seriously polluted; one lake vanishes after another; and one plot of land after another being turned into apartments which lifespan is only thirty years. How would these people care and cherish the soil of others when they wouldn’t even protect the land on which they are born and bred, which has a tie of flesh and blood, and is called as the home of their spirit?
Dignity of Female Political Prisoners in China
Written on June 7, 2011
Translated by Kriz cpec
Proofread by Michelle Adams and edited by Michelle Buchanan
Note: This article is written not only for female political prisoners, but also for all political prisoners, and every incarcerated compatriot in China.
For years I have not dared to speak to this subject despite my deep concern for the dignity of political prisoners. Because this, for the political prisoners, especially the female political prisoners, is a giant wound that bleeds forever, It has been something I really could not bear to face. But I am writing about it now because of something I witnessed on twitter.
The first tweet I saw after some days of being away from twitter was a sex-related one from Li Tiantian, a female lawyer in Shanghai who was made to disappear for more than three months during the “Jasmine revolution” in China. Shocked, I went through all of her tweets since the day of her release. Those tweets, unrestrained and wild, were completely different from how she used to speak and act before her disappearance. It made me think of my twitter friends who had written me to say that they were forced to surrender their twitter accounts, and that tweets from their account were not their own writings. So I assumed that Li Tiantian’s account was stolen from her, that those tweets were posted by the State Security officers with the intention of destroying her reputation. I made this thought public in a tweet.
Translated by Kriz cpec
Proofread by Michelle Adams and edited by Michelle Buchanan
Note: This article is written not only for female political prisoners, but also for all political prisoners, and every incarcerated compatriot in China.
For years I have not dared to speak to this subject despite my deep concern for the dignity of political prisoners. Because this, for the political prisoners, especially the female political prisoners, is a giant wound that bleeds forever, It has been something I really could not bear to face. But I am writing about it now because of something I witnessed on twitter.
The first tweet I saw after some days of being away from twitter was a sex-related one from Li Tiantian, a female lawyer in Shanghai who was made to disappear for more than three months during the “Jasmine revolution” in China. Shocked, I went through all of her tweets since the day of her release. Those tweets, unrestrained and wild, were completely different from how she used to speak and act before her disappearance. It made me think of my twitter friends who had written me to say that they were forced to surrender their twitter accounts, and that tweets from their account were not their own writings. So I assumed that Li Tiantian’s account was stolen from her, that those tweets were posted by the State Security officers with the intention of destroying her reputation. I made this thought public in a tweet.
The Daydream of Xinhua News Agency
(Translated by krizcpec, copyedited by Michelle BUCHANAN)
The Chinese government has been feeling quite satisfied with its “great external propaganda plan” lately, for a few reasons: Earlier this year, the BBC had to end its Mandarin broadcast because of insufficient funds; the question of whether the Voice of America Chinese broadcast can continue remains uncertain; and only [Xinhua News Agency], with the full support of the Chinese government, is spending a considerable amount of money attempting to take over the [Chinese] media market, just at the time when Western media is being forced to leave.
The Localization Strategy of China’s Great External Propaganda
The latest overseas developments of China’s propaganda media machine.
Translated by Paul Mooney
The Chinese government has long believed that the “right to have one’s say” is not fairly distributed around the world, with 80 percent of news and information reporting monopolized by Western media.1 Under the government’s “Great External Propaganda Plan,” which aims at promoting and vying for China’s right to have its say [in the international community], China has spared no expense to continuously nurture various external propaganda media. Since the American economic crisis began in 2008, The Christian Science Monitor and several other mainstream Western media outlets have shut down newspapers and magazines one after the other in order to cut costs. The Chinese government feels that this is the perfect opportunity to expand the presence of Chinese media around the world. If the Southern Media Group’s huge bid to purchase Newsweek had not made Americans feel the threat, then the plan by the state-run Xinhua News Agency to set up its North American headquarters in Times Square, next door to such world famous news organizations as Reuters, The New York Times, News Corp., and others, surely succeeded in making the American media feel that “the Chinese are coming.”2 “While our media empires are melting away like the Himalayan glaciers, China’s are expanding,” said Orville Schell, director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York and a former dean of the journalism school at the University of California, Berkeley. “They want to get every hallmark of the world of credible journalism they can, and being in New York City, in an iconic location, is part of that.”3
China's Listing Social Structure
PREFACE
He Qinglian was born in Shaoyang in the province of Hunan in 1956. Sent as a teenager to work in the countryside on a railway construction site, she studied history at Hunan Normal University and economics at Fudan University in Shanghai, passing out in 1985. After teaching jobs in Changsha and Guangzhou, she moved to the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen, working first in the publicity department of the municipal Party Committee, and then on the Shenzhen Legal Daily. In August 1996 she completed a book on the social and economic ills of China after two decades of reform policies, declined as too explosive by eight or nine publishers. But after it appeared in Hong Kong in 1997 under the title China’s Pitfall, an expurgated version was published in Beijing as Modernization’s Pitfall in January 1998, with a preface by Liu Ji, Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, then an adviser to Jiang Zemin. The book was an immediate sensation, as a blistering indictment of far-reaching inequality and corruption in the PRC, selling 200,000 legal copies and vastly more pirated ones.
He Qinglian was born in Shaoyang in the province of Hunan in 1956. Sent as a teenager to work in the countryside on a railway construction site, she studied history at Hunan Normal University and economics at Fudan University in Shanghai, passing out in 1985. After teaching jobs in Changsha and Guangzhou, she moved to the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen, working first in the publicity department of the municipal Party Committee, and then on the Shenzhen Legal Daily. In August 1996 she completed a book on the social and economic ills of China after two decades of reform policies, declined as too explosive by eight or nine publishers. But after it appeared in Hong Kong in 1997 under the title China’s Pitfall, an expurgated version was published in Beijing as Modernization’s Pitfall in January 1998, with a preface by Liu Ji, Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, then an adviser to Jiang Zemin. The book was an immediate sensation, as a blistering indictment of far-reaching inequality and corruption in the PRC, selling 200,000 legal copies and vastly more pirated ones.
A Volcanic "Stability"
Qinglian He, former senior editor of Shenzhen Legal Daily in China, is currently a visiting scholar in the department of political science, economics, and philosophy at CUNY’s College of Staten Island. She is also the author of the Chinese-language bestseller, Pitfall in China, an updated version of which was published in Japan in 2002.
How much longer can the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) last? Could China collapse into disunity or even civil war? These are challenging questions with no easy answers, and I have been asked both many times over the last few years, in China itself as well as overseas. While it is hard to predict the future with any precision, some provisional forecasting of structural changes is possible.
China is a one-party state in which the interests of the government and the CCP are indivisible. Over recent years, the only answer the Party has had in its quest to uphold civil order has been to “pull up by the roots all factors with the potential to cause instability.” The Party has worked hard to create a reality in which no organizational force can replace Communist rule. In the CCP’s view, the death of the Party would mean nothing less than the death of China itself.
How much longer can the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) last? Could China collapse into disunity or even civil war? These are challenging questions with no easy answers, and I have been asked both many times over the last few years, in China itself as well as overseas. While it is hard to predict the future with any precision, some provisional forecasting of structural changes is possible.
China is a one-party state in which the interests of the government and the CCP are indivisible. Over recent years, the only answer the Party has had in its quest to uphold civil order has been to “pull up by the roots all factors with the potential to cause instability.” The Party has worked hard to create a reality in which no organizational force can replace Communist rule. In the CCP’s view, the death of the Party would mean nothing less than the death of China itself.
The Historical Orientation of China's Reform
Modern China Studies
No. 1, 1999 (Volume 64)
No. 1, 1999 (Volume 64)
Since 1978, China’s economic reforms have proceeded under difficult circumstances of all sorts. At present, it is experiencing yet another painful period known as the "reduction of marginal effect." On the surface, the main reason for this "reduction of marginal effect" is that a variety of economic problems are hampering further reform efforts. If we choose to go below the surface, we are likely to find that these economic problems are rooted in non-economic areas, and consequently, it is impossible to remove the obstacles with pure and simple economic reform. Based on this reality, the author believes that the following issues will have to be addressed in order for China's reforms move forward. First, is it necessary to review and examine critically reform efforts to date—and to review and examine free of ideological constraints? Second, is it wise and feasible for a country to limit its reform efforts to the economic area? Third, shall social justice be taken into consideration while formulating reform policies and is it necessary to pass value judgment on the results of reform? This article will first answer these three questions and then take a step further to analyze the historical choices with which China's reform is faced today.
1. Reform Must Be Reviewed and Examined with A Critical Eye
Every major reform effort in human history has encountered various problems and side effects, which, however, should not be justified simply in the name of reform. To overcome these problems and side effects in a timely fashion, it is necessary to review and examine critically the reform efforts. Moreover, any reform turns the old social order upside down and redistributes social benefits, and therefore is bound to meet resistance and opposition from various directions. We should not purposefully avoid a critical review and examination of reforms because of such resistance and opposition.
1. Reform Must Be Reviewed and Examined with A Critical Eye
Every major reform effort in human history has encountered various problems and side effects, which, however, should not be justified simply in the name of reform. To overcome these problems and side effects in a timely fashion, it is necessary to review and examine critically the reform efforts. Moreover, any reform turns the old social order upside down and redistributes social benefits, and therefore is bound to meet resistance and opposition from various directions. We should not purposefully avoid a critical review and examination of reforms because of such resistance and opposition.
The Boat and the Water
Translated by Paul Frank
This article is drawn from two series of articles originally published in Chinese in Taiwan News Weekly: “Huaijie chengzhi: waizi zai zhongguode ruxiangsuisu,” August 5-13, 2004, and “Zhongguo xiyin waizi mianlin zhuangzhedian,” June 16-24, 2005.
This article is drawn from two series of articles originally published in Chinese in Taiwan News Weekly: “Huaijie chengzhi: waizi zai zhongguode ruxiangsuisu,” August 5-13, 2004, and “Zhongguo xiyin waizi mianlin zhuangzhedian,” June 16-24, 2005.
* * *
China remains one of the world’s most popular foreign investment destinations. Yet the evidence suggests that some of the commonly accepted assumptions of mutual benefit are false.
During his address to the Fortune Global Forum in Beijing on May 18, Bo Xilai, the Chinese Minister of Commerce, claimed that China has been very profitable for foreign businesses. He said that of more than 280,000 foreign invested enterprises in operation between 1990 and 2004, two-thirds were profitable.[1] According to the 2004 survey of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, three-fourths of surveyed U.S. companies in China were making a profit, and for 42 percent of them, their profit ratio in China exceeded their global average. A "2005 Foreign Investment Survey" published by the Chinese edition of Fortune magazine emphasizes that doing business in China is by no means as unprofitable as is often suggested outside of China. More than 90 percent of foreign companies think that they can make a profit within five years.[2]
During his address to the Fortune Global Forum in Beijing on May 18, Bo Xilai, the Chinese Minister of Commerce, claimed that China has been very profitable for foreign businesses. He said that of more than 280,000 foreign invested enterprises in operation between 1990 and 2004, two-thirds were profitable.[1] According to the 2004 survey of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, three-fourths of surveyed U.S. companies in China were making a profit, and for 42 percent of them, their profit ratio in China exceeded their global average. A "2005 Foreign Investment Survey" published by the Chinese edition of Fortune magazine emphasizes that doing business in China is by no means as unprofitable as is often suggested outside of China. More than 90 percent of foreign companies think that they can make a profit within five years.[2]
Rural Economy at a Dead End: A Dialogue on Rural China, Peasants and Agriculture
By He, Qinglian*, Visiting Scholar, University of Chicago,
and Cheng, Xiaonong, Editor-in-Chief, Contemporary China Studies
Modern China Studies
No.3, 2001
and Cheng, Xiaonong, Editor-in-Chief, Contemporary China Studies
Modern China Studies
No.3, 2001
China and India: Latecomers to the Road of Modernization
He Qinglian: The human race experienced a number of social changes in the last century. Among them, only two great changes produced a lasting impact. First, the political system of democracy has emerged as the generally accepted model for political governance around the world. Second, the class of small peasants has decline and perhaps even begun to disappear. The latter change has permanently severed the historical umbilical cord that for generations has linked humankind with its past. What cannot be ignored is that a certain relationship exists between these two drastic social changes. Ultimately, politics is nothing but the sum total of all the social relationships of humankind. The characteristics of the people will determine the nature of their government, and the nature of the government will determine the characteristics of its people.
He Qinglian: The human race experienced a number of social changes in the last century. Among them, only two great changes produced a lasting impact. First, the political system of democracy has emerged as the generally accepted model for political governance around the world. Second, the class of small peasants has decline and perhaps even begun to disappear. The latter change has permanently severed the historical umbilical cord that for generations has linked humankind with its past. What cannot be ignored is that a certain relationship exists between these two drastic social changes. Ultimately, politics is nothing but the sum total of all the social relationships of humankind. The characteristics of the people will determine the nature of their government, and the nature of the government will determine the characteristics of its people.
A Different Type of Social Power: Underground Criminal Organizations
In an effort to fight underground criminal organizations, China’s Ministry of Public Security launched a ten-month long nationwide campaign at the end of 2000 using the operation code-names Fox Hunting, Raging Tide, Nill, Hurricane, and others.
It is a known fact that a considerably large number of underground criminal organizations have emerged in our country, and these are mainly territory-based entities. China is divided into seven administrative levels: state, province, municipality, county (or larger districts and smaller cities), township, village (or sub-district), neighborhood. These criminal organizations have generally been formed along these lines, that is, within a province, a city, a county, a township, or a village. Some of the notorious criminal organizations that were outlawed several years ago and subsequently banned are Xinjiang Gang in Shanghai, Beijing Gang and White Shark Gang in Guangdong, Ganzhou Gang in Jiangxi Province, and the Wolf Gang in Shanxi Province. The membership of these organizations consists mainly of employees of business enterprises, "waiting for work" youths, and/or peasants. The fact that most of these gang members are friends characterizes their inter-member relationship. Some of the criminal organizations have a comparatively tight, linear-like structure reinforced by harsh disciplinary measures. Members are differentiated by ranks while the organizational structure models that of an extended family. There are also criminal organizations that are kinship-based (genealogical) or occupation-based (linked by the same type of crimes committed). Of the three types, most organizations are either territory-based or kinship-based.
On Systemic Corruption in China and its Influence
The international community is fully cognizant of the seriousness of government corruption in China. China remains one of the few countries that continue to employ strict control of media and the Internet, and the organization Transparency International has still not been able to obtain permission to open an office in the country. As a consequence, it should not surprise us that the international community lacks a clear picture of the actual extent and nature of corruption and its negative influence on the country’s future development.
This paper will attempt to clarify and address the following problems:
1.The relationship between political corruption and the social system;
2.The areas where there is a high occurrence of corruption and its forms;
3.The unfavorable influence of corruption on social development;
4.The methods employed by the Chinese government to strengthen social control.
The paper concludes that, under the current social system, the government is incapable of finding a solution to a problem that it has itself created. As a Chinese saying puts it, even the sharpest blade cannot be used on itself! The government's measures against corruption in China are comparable to a surgeon performing an operation on himself. Serious corruption has devastated the very foundations of Chinese society and enveloped the country in a state of crisis—a volcanic landscape dotted with underground fires—and on the brink of erupting.
This paper will attempt to clarify and address the following problems:
1.The relationship between political corruption and the social system;
2.The areas where there is a high occurrence of corruption and its forms;
3.The unfavorable influence of corruption on social development;
4.The methods employed by the Chinese government to strengthen social control.
The paper concludes that, under the current social system, the government is incapable of finding a solution to a problem that it has itself created. As a Chinese saying puts it, even the sharpest blade cannot be used on itself! The government's measures against corruption in China are comparable to a surgeon performing an operation on himself. Serious corruption has devastated the very foundations of Chinese society and enveloped the country in a state of crisis—a volcanic landscape dotted with underground fires—and on the brink of erupting.
China's Latent Economic Crisis and Potential Risks
Modern China Studies
No. 2, 1999 (Volume 65)
Since the beginning of broad ranging economic reform [in 1978], China's economy has been growing at a pace that commands the world's admiration. Entering the 1990s, however, the high-speed growth of the virtual economy has produced a large number of bubbles. Arguably, the major factor contributing to the dramatic growth of our country's economy in the past twenty years has been rapid investment. However, the quality of economic growth produced by this "investment, investment and more investment" model has been relatively mediocre. In recent years, the bubbles accumulated through sustained, ineffective supply have become a cause for concern that further development might be accompanied by potential risks.
No. 2, 1999 (Volume 65)
Since the beginning of broad ranging economic reform [in 1978], China's economy has been growing at a pace that commands the world's admiration. Entering the 1990s, however, the high-speed growth of the virtual economy has produced a large number of bubbles. Arguably, the major factor contributing to the dramatic growth of our country's economy in the past twenty years has been rapid investment. However, the quality of economic growth produced by this "investment, investment and more investment" model has been relatively mediocre. In recent years, the bubbles accumulated through sustained, ineffective supply have become a cause for concern that further development might be accompanied by potential risks.
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