After 19 months of talks and quarrels, the phase one of the agreement between China and the US is about be materialized. Judging from the text, both sides have made concessions. The US got its way regarding intellectual property rights and lowering trade deficit; China secured the cancellation of some of the tariffs imposed. From the perspective of the respective needs of both sides, Xi Jinping got a breather in alleviating domestic economic pressure; Trump got to free his hands to focus on the general election in 2020. Only two groups of people felt particularly dissatisfied with the deal. One group being the people do not want to see Trump reelected. Paul Krugman for one wrote a piece for the New York Times on December 17, insisting that Trump lost in this trade war. The other group being the opposition camp in China, a camp that wished Trump to directly bring about the collapse of the Communist party by means of the trade war. These two groups people had basically disregarded the fact that the fruit of victory for the US lay not in such trivial matters as tariffs but in forcing the Communist Party to revert from the aggressive mode back to the defensive mode.
Showing posts with label CPC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CPC. Show all posts
How far is the crisis resonance away from China
By He Qinglian on September 10, 2012.
At a time when foreign financial institutions frequently issue warnings on China’s economy—its financial sector in particular, Jackson Diehl of Washington Post jumped on the band wagon. In his article published in the September/October issue of World Affairs, Diehl made an even more pessimistic prediction, stating that authoritarians in both China and Russia are facing a coming collapse, and yet neither of the two U.S. presidential candidates has made any preparation on that.
When foreign China watchers observe China, they frequently overlook one thing: the politics with the CPC characteristics is politics without responsibility. The heads of the Party and of the government have never had to shoulder responsibility for their policy mistakes. If half (not all) of the current signs of crises in China emerge in the U.S., Japan or the E.U., the economic crisis of these countries would have long turned into a political one, resulting in the collapse of the government, the resignation of the cabinet, as has happened in Greece.
At a time when foreign financial institutions frequently issue warnings on China’s economy—its financial sector in particular, Jackson Diehl of Washington Post jumped on the band wagon. In his article published in the September/October issue of World Affairs, Diehl made an even more pessimistic prediction, stating that authoritarians in both China and Russia are facing a coming collapse, and yet neither of the two U.S. presidential candidates has made any preparation on that.
When foreign China watchers observe China, they frequently overlook one thing: the politics with the CPC characteristics is politics without responsibility. The heads of the Party and of the government have never had to shoulder responsibility for their policy mistakes. If half (not all) of the current signs of crises in China emerge in the U.S., Japan or the E.U., the economic crisis of these countries would have long turned into a political one, resulting in the collapse of the government, the resignation of the cabinet, as has happened in Greece.
The Inherent Conflict between Collective Leadership and Dictatorship
By He Qinglian on Aug 16, 2012.
After the three trials related to Bo Xilai were over, the Publicity Office of the CPC Central Committee held a press conference on August 14 to introduce how the election of the 18th CPC Party Congress would proceed; at the same time, a representative list consisting 2270 people was revealed. Yet information like when the Congress is to commence, and crucial personnel arrangement such as Politburo candidates, and whether the number of Politburo Standing Committee members would be reduced from nine to seven remain tightly guarded secrets.
For a transfer of power at the top of China to become a soap opera that of homicide, corruption, mysteries, and erotic connection, the desire for power is entirely to blame.
After the three trials related to Bo Xilai were over, the Publicity Office of the CPC Central Committee held a press conference on August 14 to introduce how the election of the 18th CPC Party Congress would proceed; at the same time, a representative list consisting 2270 people was revealed. Yet information like when the Congress is to commence, and crucial personnel arrangement such as Politburo candidates, and whether the number of Politburo Standing Committee members would be reduced from nine to seven remain tightly guarded secrets.
For a transfer of power at the top of China to become a soap opera that of homicide, corruption, mysteries, and erotic connection, the desire for power is entirely to blame.
The Achilles' heel of Collective Leadership
Three things to look at in the Bogu Kailai case
By He Qinglian on July 30, 2012.
At the time when the slogan “defend to the death the 18th National Congress” appears in China, the authorities announced that the trial of the Bogu Kailai case would commence in recent days. Without doubt, this action means top level officials at Zhongnanhai want to settle this case as quickly as possible. Hu Jintao intended to show his political rivals—both openly and secretly—that the Bogu Kailai case is a criminal one, it would at most implicate Bo only. Knowing this from Hu's speech in a hotel in early May, his opponents want it closed as soon as possible, for fear that dreary scenario would arise.
At the time when the slogan “defend to the death the 18th National Congress” appears in China, the authorities announced that the trial of the Bogu Kailai case would commence in recent days. Without doubt, this action means top level officials at Zhongnanhai want to settle this case as quickly as possible. Hu Jintao intended to show his political rivals—both openly and secretly—that the Bogu Kailai case is a criminal one, it would at most implicate Bo only. Knowing this from Hu's speech in a hotel in early May, his opponents want it closed as soon as possible, for fear that dreary scenario would arise.
On Vogel's book about Deng Xiaoping
Though Deng's era is over, his legacy is yet to be concluded.
Written by He Qinglian on June 18, 2012.
(Translated by kRiZcPEc).
The Chinese version of Deng Xiaoping and the transformation of
China, written by Ezra F.
Vogel, a professor at Harvard University, has recently been
available. Although there are already various versions of biographies
of Deng Xiaoping, including My father Deng Xiaoping by Deng
Rong “Maomao”, and hardly any breakthrough could be achieved in
terms of historical data, this book by Vogel is about a world class
great man, and the author is a renowned China scholar who was once
influential both in the politics and academic circles. These two
factors per se are sufficient to attract the eyeballs of readers.
In his recent interviews following the publication of the Chinese
version of his book, Mr. Vogel made comments about Deng Xiaoping and
gave a series of “if” that showed clearly how much he worshiped
Deng. The most controversial and the hardest not to disagree was his
defense for Deng Xiaoping's decision errors in squelching the
“June-4th” Tiananmen movement.
Nine Dragons—Power Struggle in Beijing
Under the Joint Governance of Nine Dragons, the Power Struggle in Beijing that started high and ended low.
By He Qinglian on May 28, 2012
Since February this year, Beijing has become the world's largest center of rumors production and dissemination. As May arrived, details leaked from Beijing-approved insiders decreased gradually; nonetheless, observers could still tell from the signs that things have been changing favorably for the faction that supported Bo Xilai.
Of the limited pieces of information that had come to light, the most important was the report on May 25 by Reuters, quoting an insider source. It was said that in early May, the Communist Party of China held a meeting at the Jingxi Hotel of Beijing, roughly 200 persons attended. General Secretary Hu Jintao said on the meeting that the Bo Xilai incident would be classified as “criminal offense”, and an “isolated case”; he urged senior CPC officials to unite and guard against further intensification of affairs since former Chongqing Committee Secretary Bo Xilai was striped of his post. Reuters said the informants were three individuals with close connections to that meeting. If this information is trustworthy, then the “line struggle” approach that Wen Jiabao proposed to convict Bo Xilai after his case went public has already been abandoned.
A glimpse of the endgame of the power struggle
Catching
a glimpse of the endgame of the power struggle through the news leak from Beijing
By He Qinglian on May 14, 2012
Read the original Chinese article
On
May 11, Japan’s Fuji Evening News published a shocking story: “Exclusive
interview with Bo Xilai, the disgraced Chinese leader”. The report said that on
April 26, Chinese state security agents arranged Keisuke Udagawa of Yamato
Press to have dinner with the disgraced Bo Xilai under their watch.
That was the first time Bo met with the outside
world after he was placed under house arrest. The story was without doubt
explosive, those who read it invariably found it shocking and incredible. Most
were asking: firstly, why was Keisuke
Udagawa chosen for a meeting that would not be possible
under normal circumstances? Why did Beijing pick an entertainment media outlet
that was not specialized in reporting political news, and not major British and
American media or media from Hong Kong and Taiwan? Secondly, why was the
interview that took place on April 26 published a half-month later on May 11?
Sewage Bucket Effect Diminishes
Anti-Bo Xilai campaign indicates the “Sewage Bucket”effect is
diminishing
By He Qinglian on Apr 26, 2012
Read the Original Chinese Article
By now the Anti-Bo Xilai campaign initiated by Zhongnanhai is near its end. In hindsight this campaign could be seen as an “internal affair” in which the Communist Party of China (CPC) “purges the 'bad elements'” within its party. Given that the CPC is China's sole long-term ruling party, this is of course one of China's national affairs, and a big one, too. Putting in that much amount of public opinion resources, even resorted to continually feeding information to media of different languages around the world so they have their turns of exclusive stories, Beijing is of course hoping to get something in return.
By He Qinglian on Apr 26, 2012
Read the Original Chinese Article
By now the Anti-Bo Xilai campaign initiated by Zhongnanhai is near its end. In hindsight this campaign could be seen as an “internal affair” in which the Communist Party of China (CPC) “purges the 'bad elements'” within its party. Given that the CPC is China's sole long-term ruling party, this is of course one of China's national affairs, and a big one, too. Putting in that much amount of public opinion resources, even resorted to continually feeding information to media of different languages around the world so they have their turns of exclusive stories, Beijing is of course hoping to get something in return.
The flaw in CPC Collective Leadership System: Insufficient authority and Internal Split
The flaw in the Collective Leadership
System of the CPC: Insufficient authority and Internal Split
By
He Qinglian on May 7, 2012
The Collective Leadership System,
which the Communist Party of China (CPC) uses to disperse the highest
authority, is now facing grave crisis.
The
CPC, the Party which has always emphasized its entire membership to
be “in close solidarity with the Party Central that centers on
comrades so-and-so”, has shown the world clearly its severe
inner-split through the “Ouster of Bo Xilai” and the Chen
Guangcheng incident.
Beijing’s Rumor Control Cuts Both Ways
By He Qinglian on Apr 11, 2012
Modified version of the Epoch Times Translation
Modified version of the Epoch Times Translation
Owing to China’s information blockade, the Bo Xilai debacle has
made media of different countries play some “guessing games”.
Xinhua’s April 10 announcement pertaining to Bo’s alleged
involvement in the death of Neil Heywood momentarily brought all
these to a halt.
Already in mid-March the Communist regime made preparations to
accuse Bo of three crimes, yet the one related to “path struggle”
raised by Wen Jiabao during a March 14 press conference was not used
in the Xinhua announcement.
The Tension Between Politics and Religion in China
By He Qinglian
(Modified version of the Epoch Times translation)
Self-immolation tragedies have
continually taken place among Tibetan monks in recent months. On
March 23, People’s Daily Online blamed the Dalai Lama for inciting
Tibetan monks to self-immolate and accused him of spreading Nazism to
the Tibetan people.
Beijing and Hong Kong, a tie falling apart
Political control intensifies, Psychological alienation grows—a
commentary on the relationship between Beijing and Hong Kong
If the relationship between the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region and Beijing were to be presented in a graph, an image bearing
little resemblance to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang would emerge. While
Taiwan's relations with Beijing changes from being a pair of parallel
lines without intersection to two strings that have become entwined,
an “intimacy” that the island feels happy about for now; Tibet
and Xinjiang are originally “integral parts” of China where the
dwindling authority of the central government has to be maintained
with forcible measures; as for Hong Kong, the city has become
politically and economically inseparable from mainland China, the
people's grievances can be heard everywhere, and the sense of
alienation is strengthening by the day.
Rumors corrode Beijing's political legitimacy
Rumors corrode Beijing's political legitimacy
By He Qinglian on March 23, 2012
The perfect hotbed for rumors to thrive would be where the
politics is opaque and where power functions in a way that is
concealed from the public. China has always been full of rumors,
in particular when it is the time of chaos and confusion, or when a
dynasty nears its end. At present, the Chinese people in a time of
Web2.0 is surrounded by all sorts of rumors, as was the case when the
Qing dynasty was about to end a hundred years ago.
Rereading KGB
Rereading “KGB
- Chairmen of the state security organs: the fate of the
declassified”*
By He Qinglian on March 12, 2012
The most controversial action of the
Chinese government during this year's “Two Meetings” was its
pending passage of the draft Code of Criminal Procedure amendment**.
Article 73, the “secret arrest” article, of the draft amendment
that targeted its citizens attracted a chorus of criticism from
various sectors, who realized that such an article would become a
Sword of Damocles hanging above the heads of the Chinese people and
every one may be subjected to “secret disappearance” by the
authorities on the grounds of “threatening national security”.
Why has improvement in income distribution become the toughest task for China
He Qinglian on March 9, 2012
(translated by kRiZcPEc)
(translated by kRiZcPEc)
Just like the “Two Meetings” last
year, issues on the people's livelihood remained what the delegates
could discuss freely without worrying the potential consequences.
Included in this year's list of livelihood issues were housing and
commodity prices, social morality, food safety, and income
distribution—a topic that has been discussed annually. In the
Government Work Report Premier Wen tirelessly repeated his call for
“deepening the reform of the income distribution system and wasting
no time in formulating a comprehensive package of reform of the
income distribution system.”
Li Zhaoxing’s Common-Sense Fallacy
Li Zhaoxing’s Common-Sense Fallacy— ‘Direct elections difficult to implement in China’
By He Qinglian
Modified version of the Epoch Times translation.
By He Qinglian
Modified version of the Epoch Times translation.
Li Zhaoxing, a spokesman for the fifth session of the 11th National People’s Congress, dubbed the two meetings, delivered a fatal blow to the “political reform” fantasy propagated by regime leaders in recent years.
At a press conference on March 4, before the opening of the meeting, Li started out by commenting positively on direct elections, but then switched and said a direct election system across the country is not suitable for China.
Future of China
Future of China: Establishment of a Democratic System Outweighs the Discussion of Who would Govern
By He Qinglian on February 23, 2012
(translated by kRiZcPEc)
Since
February this year, whether the “Princelings” should take over or
senior cadres ascended from the common people (Senior Cadres hereafter)
should continue to govern appeared once again to be a big question
crucial to the future of China after Wang Lijun, former Public Security
Chief of Chongqing, stirred up quite a lot of speculations about his
stay at the US consulate-general in Chengdu. All those commentaries
published in overseas Chinese media that seemed to have come directly
from Zhongnanhai made the water more murky and the two sides strove to
give the audience an impression that they support one faction and not
the other was because if that other faction rule, grave disaster would
happen to the Chinese people.
Reality of China
Reality of China: A Mess of Wanton Graffiti Drawn with the Pen of Power
By He Qinglian on November 3, 2011
I remember when Mao Zedong came to be
the ruler of China, he described the country as a destitute state, a
sheet of blank paper on which the newest and most beautiful picture
can be drawn. After that, for three decades Mao Zedong ruled and he
left on China his powerful drawings, done in a manner that was
willful and wild. In the three decades that followed, officials at
various levels at the central and local governments have been
painting the country with a host of methods at will. Now, with little
white space left, the drawings on the blank sheet of China are
testing the lowest limits of human esthetic values and moral
principles.
How far away democratic politics is from China
He Qinglian on Dec 30, 2011
It has become a national consensus that China must implement democracy, and that the sooner that happens, the better. Yet divergent opinions on how democracy is to be implemented, and how great a price the populace is willing to pay to bring about democracy remain. The reason for this is simple: each class has its own interests to consider.
It has become a national consensus that China must implement democracy, and that the sooner that happens, the better. Yet divergent opinions on how democracy is to be implemented, and how great a price the populace is willing to pay to bring about democracy remain. The reason for this is simple: each class has its own interests to consider.
Background analysis of the soft solution to Wukan Incident
By He Qinglian on Dec 22, 2011
(translated by kRiZcPEc)
(translated by kRiZcPEc)
This year is drawing to a close in China with colors brighter than the last: the tragic death of Qian Yunhui, chief of Zhaiqiao village, Leqing, Zhejiang in 2010 ended the year with sadness. This year, however, villagers at Wukan village, Shanwei, Guangdong marked the end of it with their persistent protests, an ending that made the Chinese people feel somewhat relieved. There are still something to worry about though. For example, retaliation from the government in future; and how the core issue that triggered this standoff—land sell would be solved remains to be seen.
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