He Qinglian on Dec 30, 2011
It
has become a national consensus that China must implement democracy,
and that the sooner that happens, the better. Yet divergent opinions on
how democracy is to be implemented, and how great a price the populace
is willing to pay to bring about democracy remain. The reason for this
is simple: each class has its own interests to consider.
Thanks
to Han Han, discussion on revolution, democracy and freedom has at last
appeared on the Internet because of his three blog entries. Contrary to
the discussion on the relationship between revolution and reform during
the 1980s, the enlightenment period in China; and “bidding adieu to
revolution”, an ideological trend triggered by reflections on June-4th
during the 1990s, this time the discussion is not about one concept versus
another, nor is it caught in the maze of theories. Rather, almost all
who participate in the discussion made their argument based on a direct
response to the reality.
Has Han Han changed or was it the public misinterpreted him in the first place?
To
begin with, let's make clear the relationship between revolution,
democracy and freedom. The three are interrelated, but of them only
democracy is the goal, revolution is but a more radical means to realize
democracy; and individual freedom is both a basis upon which democracy
is to be established and a value that needs to be safeguarded by
democracy. Many articles have been written both to criticize the three
articles by Han Han and to defend them. To me it was the brief comment
Li Jian, associate professor at Shanghai University of Finance and
Economics, posted in his weibo that was most to the point. He stated
that the thoughts behind Han Han's three blog posts, “On Revolution”,
“On Democracy” and “Wanting Freedom” were clear and obvious: oppose
revolution, worry about democracy and asking for freedom.
Some
people thought that Han Han has transformed [into a different person],
that's a view that I do not share. Over the years the Chinese public had
seriously misinterpreted Han Han, a person who has been forced to learn
living wittily under an autocratic regime and whose perception of China
and the characteristics of the people could be described as despondent.
What he did this time was only presenting a summary of his long held
thoughts under these three topics. I saw eye to eye with him in some of
the conclusion he made. For example, he wrote that “To believe in the
Velvet Revolution requires that you believe in the character of the
people, the tolerance of the authorities and the leadership of the
intellectuals. The Velvet Revolution took place as the result of these
three groups coming together. I do not believe that these groups exist
in China.”
In
fact, apart from “the character of the people” being the only factor
that could be discussed, the degree of arbitrariness in China's ruling
bloc's expansion of its power can in no way be matched by Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali and Hosini Mubarak. And the influence intellectuals have
on society has been weakening in the past six or seven years; the
impact of academics who are not without caring of the reality or the
sense of social responsibility has been greatly nullified by a few
activists and verbal activists.
Although
Han Han wrote in his personal capacity, his thoughts are essentially
the basic consensus of China's middle class. At this stage, the middle
class is by and large dependent on the [political] system, totally or
partially. They feel deeply depressed about their lack of freedom,
hopeless about political corruption, and yet they remain doubtful of
grass-root democracy. Because in the historical memory of the Chinese
people, “revolution” is but a peasant revolution which, modeled after
the Communist revolution, would take countless lives and aims to plunder
public and private properties. The recent surge of the prestige of Wang
Yang, Governor of Guangdong, after he peacefully resolved the protests
at Wukan is itself evident that the mainstream opinion in China is still
yearning for the country to implement open autocracy, or the sort of
authoritarian rule Han Han hopes for, which allows certain room for
speech and individual liberty.
All
these years Han Han's satires on and criticisms of the current
[political] system and its many defects have been inside this scope.
There has been a time factor that Han Han's comments grew widely popular
in China. In those years, China's social conflicts weren't fully
intensified yet. Back then the middle class, still in the upward
channel, was drinking cappuccino, fostering the lifestyle of petite
bourgeoisie, imagining the wonderful life ahead. Both the society inside
China and the international community were filled with hopes that the
country could naturally evolved into a democracy in future. It was only
under this social atmosphere that Han Han could, with his plaintive but
not blame-placing satires, become an icon of Chinese culture in the
noughties of twenty-first century.
Rather
than a sudden u-turn in Han Han's thoughts that his three essays on
revolution, democracy, and freedom attracted fierce criticism, it is
because of the rapid changes to China's social conditions that are
taking place. The dominant opinion on the internet is shifting slowly
from the lighthearted sarcasm and ridicule of the past to a heavy sense
of anger and despair. At the same time, the attitude the international
community has toward China is also changing. For example, the U.S.
political circle had in the past been hoping that China would
“peacefully evolve” into democracy amidst its opening and economic
reform. But this year, they too started doubting if this wish of theirs
is unrealistic and cast a giant question mark on the premise that China
would “peacefully evolve”. That question mark is getting darker in
color.
To
me, the misinterpretation the public made of Han Han and the social
process from which elites are shaped during their interactions with
Chinese recipients are contemporary topics that carry much observation
and study values.
[Back
to the topic.] Regarding Han Han, I do not agree with him views because
of the following two reasons. First, I think that for China at the
moment there is moral basis for the use of any possible means to end
quickly the one-party-dictatorship. Second, I know that freedom is not
free, and he wishes not having to pay much for it or not having to pay
for it at all. Among the countries drawn in the Arab spring, Tunisia was
the only one with a relatively moderate revolution. Revolutions in
other countries—including the “second revolution” that is taking place
now in Egypt [are different]: while the protesters and the authorities
there are in the process of political wrestling, the “negotiation of
blade versus blade” has never been absent.
Revolution, democracy and freedom in Chinese political context
Reviewing
the aspirations and requests of the over one billion population of
China, it should be said that according to the different social levels
they are in, and the social resources they have respectively, different
classes and groups differ in the priority of, even huge discrepancy in
their aspirations and demands. For example, while what the general
public need the most is a comparatively fair and square distribution of
social resources, the thing they see as most urgent is to protect their
rights of survival; the intellectuals and the middle class hope for a
comparatively relax on freedom of speech and of association. Yet under
the current [political] system, the general public couldn't get fairness
and equity, let alone the protection of their rights of survival. No
substitute for these rights of theirs to be found in the virtual world.
On the contrary, while the intellectuals and middle classes do not enjoy
freedom of speech and of association, they can find in the virtual
space of the internet partial substitutes such as weibo, which provides
them a limited room for speech and a space for them to get together with
like-minded virtual companions.
But,
as social conflicts accumulate and erupt, the authorities is tightening
the rope of maintaining stability. Apart from the rulers who insist on
the “five won'ts” and those who got too deeply ingrained with [official
doctrine against democracy], anyone who has a clear mind would more or
less realize that only a democratic system can ensure the justice and
equity that the general public desires and satisfies the individual
freedom and rights that intellectuals and the middle class yearn for. The
division of opinions is mainly about the path through which democracy is
to be established. Put simply, that means what kind of price the people
are willing to pay for establishing a democracy. Only when this is understood could we find out which class would become the main force that drives
China to change, and the capability it has for that change.
Clearly
now China's middle class is not the main body of revolution demand.
Under the current [political] system in China, it takes almost a
lifetime of hard work—or even the combined efforts of two generations—for
Chinese people who are not part of the privileged class to become a
member of the middle class and to secure that status. And the sort of
revolution that the Chinese people are familiar with are those like the
Communist revolution and Taiping Revolution—which characters are looting
of society and uprooting of social order. If there is anyone who could
persuade the nation to believe that revolution in China would cost but a
hundred of lives like Tunisia, then they might cease to view revolution
as something dreadful. Yet with the experience of revolutions that had
taken place in China in the past, the main body of the country's
intellectuals and middle class would at heart only be an ally with
power, their main demand would be social stability.
Has
China's general public a demand for revolution? Of course they have.
Yet for many this demand is still a vague idea. Since in the Chinese
society there is serious shortage of upward channels, power and
resources in recent years are showing trends of being passed on from one
generation to the next, the hope the general public has of climbing up
the social ladder through study is nearly completely dashed. Under this
social circumstance, the revolution demand of the general public, if
directed, would become an explosive force once external incentives
arise. The speech of the deputy secretary of Guangdong Provincial CPC
committee showed that he is aware of how terrible this explosive force
could be. Contrary to the years of Communist Revolution when revolution
ideals were instilled into the populace as “mobilization of the masses”
was needed, the current education system in China is instilling nothing
but the combination of Marxism and thoughts of Chairman Mao—the
preachings of “exploitation is guilty” and “rebellion is justified”—into
the students.
Under
an open authoritarian system (such as Tunisia and Russia), the public
has the freedom of association. This enables them to integrate their
interest demands through self-organization and form a pressure, making
the rulers to change. The dark autocracy of China, however, would
exhaust all means to dissipate the public's ability to self-organize,
and there are hardly any discussion platforms where different classes
can exchange their views.
Possible prospects and the only viable hedging strategy for the country
To
this date the path of “reform” that the nation aspires to—or once
aspired to—remains hopeless. As early back as in 2008, I wrote in my
article “ Thirty years ofreform: Abnormal development of national capacity and itsconsequences”
that the Chinese government has long degraded into a self-serving
political bloc that is working for its own interests. The
characteristics of this type of politics are that the government is like
a giant machine which is running routine procedures, each of its
members is just a component of the machine. Although there are a few
awaken persons inside the bloc who are conscious of the looming danger,
and know where the root of the problems is, they haven't got enough
ability to stop the routine operation of that machine. Since last year,
Premier of the State Council Wen Jiabao had spoken on several occasion
about reform on the political system. That those speeches were of scarce
impact on politics in reality was precisely because Wen personally
doesn't have the capability to halt the frenzy operation of that
machine. And it is as a result of not seeing any hope in improving the
political system that China's elites and the middle class are so keen to
emigrate, seeing that as a necessary hedging strategy for their family
and themselves.
This type of self-serving government cannot last its rule indefinitely. And now perhaps only those
stubborn-minded would believe in the premise that “economic development
is conducive to democratization”. Looking back in history, outbreaks of
revolutions depend on three factors which are ripe and are coming
together: full-blown economic crisis (especially the financial crisis of
a government); popular aspiration for change and a consensus has been
reached regarding the path of that change; the continual pushes and
strong involvement at critical juncture of changes from the
international community—the external forces that the Communist Party is guarding against. For China,
the very cruel outlook is perhaps before the arrival of a revolution,
this situation of “a crumbling society without the regime tumbling down”
has already depleted the resources needed for social reconstruction,
resulting in country's descent into the rank of “ failed states”.
Although
the CPC still has power in its grip, it is losing the people. The ideal
way for the party to save the country and itself would be, as allowed
by a timetable, to establish open autocracy through partial delegation,
allowing society to enjoy a space for speech that is relatively free and
the freedom to associate, gradually lifting the ban on forming
political parties, implementing local autonomy in areas where conditions
are met. Once these [are carried out], the probability of China
becoming a hotbed of violence(not just that of revolutions, but also the violent
spread of criminal offenses) would be much lower, and the way CPC
leaves the historical stage would also be much more moderate.
