Anti-Bo Xilai campaign indicates the “Sewage Bucket”effect is
diminishing
By He Qinglian on Apr 26, 2012
Read the Original Chinese Article
By now the Anti-Bo Xilai campaign initiated by Zhongnanhai is near
its end. In hindsight this campaign could be seen as an “internal
affair” in which the Communist Party of China (CPC) “purges the 'bad elements'” within its party. Given that the CPC is
China's sole long-term ruling party, this is of course one of China's
national affairs, and a big one, too. Putting in that much amount of
public opinion resources, even resorted to continually feeding
information to media of different languages around the world so they
have their turns of exclusive stories, Beijing is of course hoping to
get something in return.
Lets first look at what those in power have gotten in return.
Through the media around the world, the Bo Xilai incident created a
theater effect far greater than all monarchs' repression of
insurgencies in the history of China. Zhongnanhai made every plan,
formulated all winning strategies, prepared for all possible
outcomes, fed foreign media every piece of information they wanted to
make known and ended the game with the total discredit of Bo and Gu,
two members of small and medium red families in the politics circle
of China. This result was not brought about because Bo was too
incompetent a person; rather, it is the inevitable outcome of the CPC
political system which stipulates that local top officials take
charge of only the civil matters and not military affairs.
That local top officials have no command over the military serves
as the last “firewall” against their challenge to and impact on
the central government. The repression of this revolt was unlike the
Rebellion of the Seven States that was quelled by Emperor Jing of
Han, at that time the princes could have their own army; it was not
like Kangxi emperor having to build up his strength before victory
could be secured in the fight against the Revolt of the Three
Feudatories either. Hu Jintao, the “reigning emperor” has in his
hand adequate institutional resources: the army, the police, the
state security system, and the propaganda apparatus. To deal with
Bo's supporters, Hu's plan is to “shake the mountain to scare the
tiger”: obey or end up removed from the list of state leaders, and
discredited far and wide like the Bo and Gu families.
That maneuver has successfully resolved the position issue of
state leaders and members of the third and fourth generations in the
CPC “Board of Red Directors”. All those who have personally
experienced the pride the elder princelings take in themselves would
know that these people have always regarded themselves as official
members of the “Board of Red Directors,” based upon one
criterion: their fathers played a part in the CPC establishment of
its rule and served as officials at provincial and ministerial
levels. As their claims said, “our father fought and sacrificed for
the CPC so it could establish its rule.”
Based on this criterion, the elder princelings have always seen
people like Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao as chief executive officers
hired by Deng Xiaoping to do the housekeeping and are not qualified
as official members of the “Board of Red Directors”. The elder
princelings are frustrated and angered to see the descendents of the
third and fourth generations of leaders blowing hot and cold in the
finance industry, reaping huge profits by hook or by crook. Those
behind the downfall of Bo were the fourth generation of “CEO” and
“deputy CEO” who made their way into the “Board of Red
Directors” and earned their official status as chairman,
vice-chairman and executive directors by means [akin to] “Management
Buy-out”. Some of those elder princelings who at present constitute
the 17th National Congress of the CPC will be stepping down from
their political or military office in the 18th National Congress by
reason of age—they will be between 60 and 70 by then—and other
factors. And the upstarts headed by Hu Jintao will over time become
the main force of the political circle of China.
What the Chinese people could gain would nothing but a spectacular
drama. Scandals about Bo exposed through various channels have again
thoroughly shed light on the inevitable ugly outcomes of one-party
dictatorship, the secret operation of Chinese politics, power
struggle and pervasive corruption. People are convinced more firmly
that anti-corruption is only a power struggle tool of the CPC. For
example, by bringing to light that the Bo Xilai family have a
whopping six billion worth of assets overseas, and questioning the
source of high tuition fees that finances Bo Guagua overseas studies,
the [messengers] have effectively proven again that senior Chinese officials have
huge quantity of assets abroad, and that the pervasive
phenomenon of huge number of children of high officials paying high
tuition fees to study overseas does indeed exist. However convincing
the CPC may sound, they can in no way guarantee that this is only an
isolated case, all others officials are clean and have no overseas
assets; that the study fees of their children all come from their
hard-earned savings. People would even reason that officials of
higher ranking would have assets much more substantial than the six
billion worth of wealth to the name of the Bo family.
As for those insulting tales about Bo Xilai, they did not just
bring shame to the Bo family; rather, they made the country see yet
again every of the inherent problems that the CPC has. Just like the tale that said Bo Xilai has 100 mistresses—why this integer 100
instead of 99 or 108 as Chinese would have preferred the most would
be something that only the messengers knew—is something the Chinese
people encounter so often that they grew accustomed to. Officials at
rankings lower than Bo Xilai have even greater number of mistresses.
Regarding the tale that implied Gu Kailai bribed with sex to help
her husband Bo Xilai get promotion would only make people realize
after all the way a seat in the politburo is secured is so
despicable, and in the same way as the lower levels of government
officials positions are being traded for money and mistresses. For
instance, a ministerial official in Kaifeng, Henan has more than 300
mistresses.
Few people would think the Bo Xilai case occurred only because Gu Kailai
was unusually bad a person, the Chinese people have learned from
countless incidents that the officials, when in power, all
appear to be capable, wise, honorable; and they would become thieves
and thugs once they lose power.
Has the ouster of Bo Xilai brought about the opportunity to start
a political system reform? That is a splash of bright colors that
someone strove to paint onto this power struggle. The proof of this
is the comments Wen Jiabao made about line struggle in a press
conference on March 14, and the countless times he expressed his
yearning for democratic system.
Under the current political circumstance of China, corruption is
nothing for princeling like Bo Xilai; taking someone's life is no big
thing for him, either. But he rebelled against his superiors, and
those crimes would be used as his conviction. To make it clear, from
the very beginning to the end, the power struggle this time has
totally nothing to do with the so-called “political disagreements”
at the top level.
Although Bo Xilai launched the “Singing the Red and hitting the
black” campaign in Chongqing, he did not genuinely believe in Mao
Zedong's ideology or the Cultural revolution, as his behaviors in
years prior to his assumption of the post of the CPC Chongqing
Committee Secretary showed. Instead of saying the “singing the red”
campaign manifested his political beliefs, it would be more accurate
to say that Bo used that campaign as a political means to secure
himself some support, and to shape his own political legitimacy.
Hu Jintao, on the other hand, is a true leftist. From the cultural
immersion he had gone through, to the way he thinks, as well as the
theories and propositions he raised during his two terms, all of them
embodied the characteristics of Mao's Left thinking. It was probably
his wholehearted belief in Mao Zedong that made Hu reluctant to use
the means of “line struggle” to oust Bo Xilai.
Amid the past power struggles in the history of the CPC, a
political convention has emerged. The losers would become the “sewage
buckets” which the CPC uses to keep itself clean. By placing all
the blames on those who lost, the Party continues to be “Glorious,
Great and Correct” after the power struggles have ended. This time, however, the campaign to oust Bo Xilai has
led to an embarrassing result for the CPC. While there is no question
that all those leaked tales portrayed Bo Xilai as a complete
villain, the inherent problems of the CPC itself, too, came under the spotlight in the world theater.
