Written by He Qinglian on June 18, 2012.
(Translated by kRiZcPEc).
The Chinese version of Deng Xiaoping and the transformation of
China, written by Ezra F.
Vogel, a professor at Harvard University, has recently been
available. Although there are already various versions of biographies
of Deng Xiaoping, including My father Deng Xiaoping by Deng
Rong “Maomao”, and hardly any breakthrough could be achieved in
terms of historical data, this book by Vogel is about a world class
great man, and the author is a renowned China scholar who was once
influential both in the politics and academic circles. These two
factors per se are sufficient to attract the eyeballs of readers.
In his recent interviews following the publication of the Chinese
version of his book, Mr. Vogel made comments about Deng Xiaoping and
gave a series of “if” that showed clearly how much he worshiped
Deng. The most controversial and the hardest not to disagree was his
defense for Deng Xiaoping's decision errors in squelching the
“June-4th” Tiananmen movement.
Ezra F. Vogel has his own unique and insightful interpretations of
China's realpolitik and its affairs. For example, he concluded that
reform in China was a thing so big that it took a person with a
combination of authority, background, and experience to carry out.
Deng was a man with all three of these and that was why he could
initiate the reform that transformed China. I completely agree with
his observation on this. Judging from the vision, caliber and
strength of the elders of the CPC at that time, Deng was the only one
with the courage needed to push for reform in China. That is why I
have been saying that compared with other Chinese leaders of his
contemporaries, Deng was the person who went the farthest.
Mr. Vogel's understanding of Deng Xiaoping had also grasped the
essence: “Deng was a pragmatist, not a specialist in ideology.
Unlike many other leaders of the Communist world, Deng did not think
that becoming a theorist was a prerequisite for anyone who aspired to
assume the highest office”. This has also been the consensus of the
Chinese intellectuals. The following remark, however, is more of his
own idea: “The remarks made about 'Deng Xiaoping's theory' by the
14th National Congress of the CPC aimed to illustrate that
'pragmatism' is precisely the most profound theory.”
Judging from his comments, Mr. Vogel thought very highly of this
pragmatism. My opinion is that at the political level, this very type
of pragmatism gave rise to mercenary and unscrupulous “state
opportunism”; at the sociocultural level, it directed the Chinese
people to the philistine pursuit of money above all else and
overturned the value system of the Chinese society.
This pragmatism had effectively led China through the thirty years
of reform. Yet as China achieved its “peaceful rise” in recent
years, the Chinese government intended to publicize the country's
“soft power” and make the world accept the “China model”,
only to realize that the Chinese value— “economic interests above
everything else”—is so unattractive. This cannot but say is the
consequence of Deng's pragmatism “theory”.
The other focal point of Deng Xiaoping and the transformation
of China is the attempt to
construe the relationship map of Deng Xiaoping and his contemporary
leaders, and re-examines it. The key relationship Mr. Vogel listed in
his book is predominantly that of Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun.
The narration concerning the relationship between Deng Xiaoping
and Chen Yun might present some novelty to English readers. But I
think that after all, being a biography, this book could not possibly
evade the following: the relationship between Deng Xiaoping and the
two premiers Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang; whether or not the source of
power with which Deng, a low-ranking member of the CPC, twice
dismissed the Party's General Secretary was justifiable; whether or
not it was appropriate for Deng to personally appoint Jiang Zemin as
the third generation leader, and specified that Hu Jintao was to
become leader of the fourth generation and others. All these need to
be examined.
The evaluation Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang received is becoming
higher these days. The relationship between Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang
and Zhao Ziyang involved Deng's tolerance and his repeated
transgressions of the rules of the game within the Party. The fact
that he handpicked the leaders of the third and the fourth
generations related to, the legitimacy of the non-institutional
factor of this action aside, the ability of a great political figure
to know [the capability of] others. This is all the more important
when Hu Jintao's mediocre statecraft became the curse of high-level
power struggle in China in 2012. Mr. Vogel attempted to analyze and
explain Deng's having greater power than his position would provide
him. If his analysis could be widely accepted by readers in China
(and not readers in the English-speaking world), then his viewpoints
could be said to have some merits.
During interviews, Mr. Vogel stated several times that “if
Deng Xiaoping were still alive
today, he would not...” This is a viewpoint that I really find
difficult to agree. I guess these several “ifs” more or less
reflected Mr. Vogel's disappointment with the current Chinese
leaders. And he therefore figured that if Deng Xiaoping were still
alive, and personally took charge of the government affairs, there
would be much fewer regrets in China today. This hypothesis is more
or less related to Mr. Vogel's overestimation of Deng Xiaoping's
ability.
In fact, the limits of Deng's ability
had been manifested clearly in his handling of the Tiananmen incident
in 1989. By resorting to such a wrong move, Deng had not only changed
the relationship between himself and the people, but also directed
the train of reform that he personally forged onto a rail that had no
way out. How could a great man who made the wrong response even in
the face of such a rare historic opportunity be expected to grasp the
significance the Internet has for humankind like people age below 50
do, and seize the opportunity based on that understanding in the
impending age of the network?
And there are the two principles laid
down by Deng Xiaoping: “China must not allow chaos”; and “the
[political] system must not change”. The first principle became the
source of the CPC “theory” that suggests “democracy triggers
chaos”, and evolved into the stability maintenance system that
costs hundreds of billions each year; the second one was elaborated
by Wu Bangguo, one of the “Nine Dragons” of China today as the
“five no's” and “[to] turn the will of the Party into that of
the state through legal procedures”. These two principles had
already pinned China, a country which potential instances of unrest
are everywhere, down on a life-or-death trap, and would cause grave
consequences when things go wrong. How could Deng Xiaoping, who
insisted that “the [political] system must not change”, be
expected to properly address the many conflicts and problems today
that stem from the system itself?
In early March 2002, I was invited by East Asian Legal Studies
Center of Harvard to deliver a speech. During that time, I paid a
visit to Mr. Vogel at his house. Through a conversation that lasted
two and a half hours, I was impressed by Mr. Vogel's appreciation
(mixed with well-disguised worship) of Deng Xiaoping. Therefore, I am
not surprised that he said today that “the West has underestimated
Deng Xiaoping.
It was also because I sensed this sentiment that I stressed
specifically in that conversation that: I personally do not think the
biggest flaw of Deng Xiaoping in his life was only his handling of
the June-4th incident. Rather, the biggest flaw of Deng was the
political legacy that he left behind, the “lame reform” that
excluded political reform and led to the marketization of power.
Because this characteristic had steered reform to a very dangerous
direction, “even if Jiang Zemin does not have to face all of the
consequences of the marketization of power, his successors would
undoubtedly have to”.
Mr. Vogel thought that with corruption being so pervasive a
problem today that the CPC authorities must not evade it, “Deng
Xiaoping would definitely not sit back and do nothing if he were
still alive today” even though he did tolerate corruption at a
lighter degree in the 1980s. In my opinion, however, Deng Xiaoping would
not be able to break free from the shackle that he created for
himself and the CPC: the government acts as the resource allocator,
the rule-maker of the game of economy and a game-player. Whatever
government that has in hand these three types of power could in no
way prevent corruption.
In the chapter “Deng's Place in History”, Mr. Vogel wrote that
if the Chinese people were to thank one leader for improvement in
their daily life, the person they should thank would be Deng
Xiaoping. He also questioned if there are any other leaders of 20th
century who could match him when it comes to the contributions to
improving the lives of so many people.
This “if” would emerge is a result of Mr. Vogel not having
interviewed the bottom of society or gotten close to those people or
understood them. Given that China is still in the middle of
transition, those giants who pushed for that transition would receive
comments that differ between individuals and vary from time to time.
Therefore, it is not yet time to conclude Deng's place in history.
Moreover, during Hu Jintao's second term, the various political
trends that reject reform have become pretty obvious. The Chinese
people is not just a single mass, they are not like what the Chinese
officials tend to refer to as the collective noun of “the entire
nation”. In reality, the Chinese people have long differentiate
into the various strata because of varied interests. Each of these
strata have their own interest demand, only that the authorities have
strictly suppressed them. For instance, among the crowd that miss the
Mao era are, apart from members at the bottom of society, quite a few
“red second generation”. Bo Xilai's campaigns in Chongqing were
an act of conform to this trend of thought. As for the line of new
democracy that Liu Yuan and others call to return to could at least
be seen as an attempt to revise Deng Xiaoping's path of reform.
While Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao—the latter in particular—might
not share Deng's view of Mao, they are nonetheless faithful
implementers of Deng Xiaoping's reform framework which develop only
the economy and dismiss political system reform. If the Chinese
government does not control speech, the two types of people mentioned
above would surely trace the origin of their dissatisfaction back to
the reform initiated by Deng Xiaoping. However, they criticize Deng's
reform from a perspective that differ from my own. What I criticize
is the CPC refusal to reform the political system and the incomplete
separation from Mao era, both are the root causes of current problems
in China; they, on the other hand, denounce the vices of reality,
which they deem to have stemmed from Deng's route of reform and the
abandonment of Mao's route of revolution.
Laden with praises for Deng Xiaoping, this book drew many
questions right from its publication. For instance, Mr. Vogel
invariably stepped into Deng's shoes, tried to understand his
actions—crack down on intellectuals, repress criticism—and
sympathized with him. He saw everything about China from the
pragmatic viewpoints of the CPC and showed no concern for human
rights issues. If this book were published before 2008, it might have
been able to serve Mr. Vogel's purpose of educating the U.S. public
to renew their understanding of Deng Xiaoping. But now it could be
expected that the Chinese version of the book that became available
this year would receive far fewer favorable comments than the author
and the publishing house have hoped.
The accomplishments Deng Xiaoping had
made in his lifetime was relevant to the destiny of China; all the
more so, those were related to the prospect and destiny of the CPC.
Hence, my opinion on that book is that while it is a biography that
must not to be overlooked, its conclusion of Deng Xiaoping could not
be seen as a “set-in-stone” evaluation yet. How great actually
had Deng Xiaoping accomplished in his lifetime shall have to be
attested by the future history of China.
